Islamic Army in Iraq: The US is talking to the wrong people

London-based pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat calls attention to a statement by the leader of the Islamic Army in Iraq "On the Safavid Iranian Project", posted on the IAI website. (Text version here; voice version here). Although the statement is dated December 28, the paper says it was published on the website yesterday (Saturday December 30).

The main point appears to be that as the focus of the battle shifts from the Americans to the Iranians, the Americans in their search for an exit are making the mistake of talking to "opportunists", including Baathists, who say they represent the Iraqi resistance but don't.

The newspaper's summary begins with this: The Islamic ummah should prepare for the coming fateful battle for Baghdad, against the Americans and the agents of Iran. And it warns against what it calls the "opportunists" among the Baathists, who go around saying they represent the resistance and enter into talks (on that basis) with Arab and Western countries.

The summary continues: Iraq is exposed to a double, American-Iranian, occupation, and of the two the more vile is what the statement describes as the Safavid, extirpating Iranian occupation. It is now necessary for all the mujahideen to be steadfast against the Iranian occupation as they were steadfast against the Americans. It is self-evident that the Americans are staggering in Iraq, having been coooperators with the Iranian gangs that have ignited sectarian war in Iraq...and now the Americans have realized that they were led into a trap by the Iranians, who stand to take over Iraq with all its riches as unearned booty.

The Americans, the statement said, so far do not seem to have grasped their errors, even in part. Addressing Iraqi Shiites, the statement says: Iran does not concern itself with any Shiites unless they are Persian, and all of the evidence points to that.

The statement warns the "opportunists" to desist from suggesting to Arab and Islamic and Western countries that they represent the Iraqi resistance, and this includes Baathists, who fishing in troubled waters convince the unaware that they are the leadership of the resistance, and that the Islamic Army in Iraq is affiliated with them, which is a downright lie, adding "we know their names, and we will name them by their names if they don't desist from their lying."

America, the statement said, is panting after a mirage by talking to these people, and is thus losing additional opportunities for extricating itself from the quagmire of Iraq. The statement asks Arabs and Muslims to support the people of Iraq verbally and with money and with pertinent information.

A Saudi view: Saddam execution signals Iranian hegemony in Iraq

The Riyadh-based Elaph news agency has published a report that cites political analysts who see the execution of Saddam and its timing as a major, negative, event in Saudi-Iranian relations. These analysts, says the reporter think that "a new chapter in the sporatic Iran-Saudi battle has opened today (Saturday December 30) with the execution of Saddam in the early hours of the Eid al-Adha, in the face of Iraqi law that prohibits the carrying out of executions during the Eid, while the Shiite Eid al-Adha starts tomorrow (Sunday December 31), something that leads these analysts to see a "sectarian thread" in the timing of the execution".
(Eid al-Adha begins on the tenth day of the lunar month of Dhul Hijja, and for some reason the official Sunni and Shiite determinations of this are a day apart this year).

In addition to the timing, the journalist cites at the end of this piece an Iraq expert in London who pointed out that the location also has Iranian overtones, because the execution took place at a former military-intelligence branch that was responsible in particular for dealing with Iran and Iranians.

Saudi Arabia, says the journalist, is particularly offended because this also coincides with the time of the Hajj, for which Saudi Arabia is responsible.

An official government statement referred "political murkiness (or fog or mist) affecting the deliberateness and independence of the proceedings (against Saddam)", and to the expectations of Muslims everywhere that the holy times would be respected and not insulted.

Clearly responding to direction from senior government people, the journalist offers this interpretation of the Saudi attitude: This is the second time this year, he says, that Riyadh has led the way in Arab response to a crisis, the first being the Saudi criticism of Hizbullah at the beginning of the Israel-Lebanon war. At that time the Saudi criticism was echoed by Egypt and Jordan, "in a case of political agreement that is rarely seen". And in the current case, the journalist says, the Saudi criticism has already been echoed by Tunis and Egypt, with statements by other Arab states "expected in the coming hours". (In other words, Saudi Arabia has led the way twice this year, and in both cases the "crisis" had to do with criticism of Shiites).

The journalist also cites a person he calls a "Gulf commentator" speaking from Dubai, who put the case this way: "The Iranian-American agenda probably came together in a way that is unlikely to be repeated in coming years", in the sense that Bush is hoping the execution of Saddam will somehow turn things around for him, while Iran, for its part, "deepened its control over internal Iraqi affairs via these "sectarian bonds". And the Gulf commentator went on to elaborate in this way: "If Iranian hegemony is really implanted [in Iraq]-- and that phase has begun to be evident--then it is incumbent on all the political activists in the country [to realize] that we will be facing a 'Sunni holocaust' (the journalist's quotation marks), and any whiff of civil war will mean assured Sunni victims".

And the journalist recalls the op-ed piece by Nawaf Obeid, later officially repudiated by the Saudi government, to the effect Saudi Arabia will intervene to protect Iraqi Sunnis should the need arise.

2006: The year secular nationalism handed the anti-colonialism torch to jihadi Islam

Syrian writer Hakam al-Baba writes in Al-Quds al-Arabi:

If 1996 was the year of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes that depended on it, 2006 deserves to go down in history as the year secular Arab nationalism finally passed away, after a lengthy struggle with illness, overcome by Islamist ideology which during the year cemented its control over the whole region, and was finally joined by the remnants of the Communist and the Arabist movements that had earlier been competing ideologies in this matter of opposing Western colonialism.

The collapse began a long time ago, with the 1967 defeat, and the process continued with the Egyptian recognition of Israel, the Jordanian expulsion of the Palestinian leadership, the creation of substitutes for the Arab League including a North African organization, one for the Gulf states, and so on, the various forms of support for the US in its attack on Iraq, and many events in between. There continued to be efforts to breathe life into the Arab secular-nationalist idea, including the [1972-77] Federation of Arab Republics [Libya, Egypt, Syria], the attempted union of Syria with Iraq, various treaties and so on, none of them successful.

All the while, Islam was silently at work, both in its "wilaya al faqih" version and its "caliphate" version [I am not exactly sure what he is getting at with this pairing; he suggests one is like a "government" party, the other like an "opposition" one]*, within Arab societies, distributing earthly and heavenly rewards and bribes, particularly after the definitive losses of the Iran-Iraq war and the various Arab-regime confrontations with fundamentalist jihadi groups. And it was finally in the year just past, 2006, that Islam was able to declare its final victory over that type of Arab nationalism that had been based on civil or secular concepts and projects, and the remnants of these earlier movements incorporated themselves into this new dominant form of anti-Western anti-colonialism, with for example the AlQaeda emirate in Iraq, Hizbullah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine.

[*Commenters helped out here. What this probably means is that both Shiite and Sunni Islam ("rule of the jurisprudent" of Iranian origin; and "califate" of Arab origin) generated jihadi movements that took over the ideas of anti-colonialism from the secular predecessors. An example of the first would be Hizbullah; and an example of the second would be Hamas. See the comments.]

Certainly, part of the reason for the triumph of jihadi Islam in the Arab world has to do with the ground having been prepared by the centuries-old wilaya al faqih and caliphate traditions, but another very important reason was that jihadi Islam offered to Arab populations a sense of confidence that they have been much in need of. The secular movements had limited themselves to "wars" in the radio-and-television sense. By contrast, the jihadi Islam movement was responsible for the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and later on the steadfastness of Hizbullah in the recent war; for the 9/11 attack on the America in its stronghold; for the serious losses inflicted on the American armed forces by AlQaeda in Iraq; Hamas has been able to show it can undermine the Israeli prestige; and so on. In these ways the jihadi organizations have been able to consolidate their control of the Arab street, and turn it (the Arab street) into an important power in the region for many years to come. And in the process, they have turned the earlier secular movements into so many museum exhibits, objects of no more than sympathy and pity.

Another newspaper report on potential criminal cases against Iraqi government officials

According to the London pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat, a spokesman for Saleh al-Mutlak's National Dialogue Front (Sunni) said officials in the current and former Iraqi governments should be brought before international courts for prosecution for crimes against humanity worse than those of Saddam Hussein. The spokesman, Mohamed Dayani, said the parliamentary opposition alliance has presented more than 600 supporting documents as evidence to war-crimes courts, and has sent many files which confirm the commiting of these crimes by officials of the various governments under the occupation, including the "governing council", the "transitional" and the "interim" governments, up to and including the present government.

He said the targets include a group of important political and military persons involved in creation of death-squads, and genocide (ibada jamaiya: group extermination) against Iraqis, and the persons include Abdulaziz al-Hakim, head of SCIRI and leader of the UIA parliamentary group; Ibrahim Jaafari, the former Prime Minister; Abu Hassan al-Amari, head of the Badr Corps; Baqr Jabbar Solargh, Interior Minister under Jaafari and currently Finance Minister; Muwaffaq al-Rubaie current national security adviser; along with a group of senior Iraqi army officers.

Dayani added that there has been formed a judicial council made up of Arabs, Americans and Europeans, to study these documents and files that have been presented by the parliamentary opposition to the special court for war crimes.

Following a recitation of attacks on the legality of the judgment against Saddam, the journalist continues with this:

Ali al-Jabburi, assistant secretary of the Iraqi National Founding Congress, which is headed by Jawad al-Khalasi, and which includes parties, groups and movements that resist the occupation including the Muslim Scholars Association, the Sadrist current, and a group of nationalist forces, said the execution of Saddam won't affect the alignment of forces on the street, but on the other hand it will be exploited by some to try and fan the flames of sectarian violence. He added in remarks to Al-Hayat that crime doesn't lapse with the passage of time, and it is the responsibility of the government to turn over to the court those politicians responsible for crimes against Iraqis, and also to turn over those responsible officials in the American armed forces who have been responsible for major crimes against Iraqis. (Jawad al-Khalasi is a Shiite cleric, described as close to Sistani, apparently radicalized by the US siege of Falluja in spring 2004 where he worked with his Sunni counterparts and with Sadr. I don't know anything about the Iraqi National Founding congress. NOTE: I don't really know anything about al-Khalasi either; a commenter objects to the above description and says there wasn't sweetness and light between the sects in the Falluja story. But the main thing I'd still like to know something about is the Iraqi National Founding Congress.)

(Earlier this month, on December 4, there was a piece in Azzaman that said Talabani and Hakim were thought to be opposed to the idea of an international conference on Iraq partly because of the risk this might lead to international court proceedings against Iraqi government officials and politicians. No alleged targets were named. I don't think there was any followup at that time).

To add to the mystery, Azzaman (London edition) this morning (December 30) prefaces its Saddam-execution story with this: "An official in the US State Department said yesterday there is a tendency in Washington to do away with the excuses for not holding to account current Iraqi officials who are involved in crimes against humanity, once the obstacle of having Saddam alive is eliminated, and meanwhile...(the journalist goes on to talk about the Saddam execution and doesn't return to this topic with any elaboration).

Why there's no meaningful debate about the "troop-surge"

The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia occurred because both sides had concluded that the United States supported the idea of a military solution, rather than negotiated power-sharing between the Islamic Courts organization and the so-called interim federal government (IFG). You don't have to take my word for it, it is the well-supported view of John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group (Brussels-based). Unfortunately, the only web-accessible venue for his remarks seems to be Al-Quds al-Arabi, the pan-Arab newspaper published in London.

Of course if you prefer the other approach, you could read the accounts in the NYT over the last few days, where they tell a story of exciting military strategy and with a clear-cut victory for the "government", no mention there of any negotiating option whatsoever.

It is a familiar situation: News of an exciting military victory for our side against the dangerous Islamists, touted by the readily-available NYT, and a less-exciting account, often not circulated at all in America, having to do with the actual alignment of political forces, which you really have to hunt for. Only if you put the two accounts together can you grasp the way in which the Bush administration is confirming and strengthening the anti-American, pan-Arab view, which is that Somalia is being added as the fifth Arab nation to be attacked in this way, after Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and Sudan, just for being Arab and Islamic. Ali Muhammed Fakhro, writing on the Al-Quds al-Arabi opinion page yesterday, warned people in other Arab states not to be complacent in 2007: this could happen to your country too. (It's a pdf link; it is the column at the left).

What else is new? What else is new is that the Bush administration is about to order an increase in troop levels in Iraq, and not only does nobody know why, but nobody in the American media asks why, either.

Norwegian historian and Shiite-scholar Reidar Visser yesterday sent to his e-mail subscribers (a free service) a draft op-ed piece, aimed at the American press, setting out what would be really the only rational basis for a troop-surge , and the argument goes like this: Any improvement in Iraqi security would be a boon to all, including all the Iraqi political parties. If the US is able to offer any such improvement, it should be conditioned on a commitment by the political class (particularly the leadership of SCIRI and the two big Kurdish parties) to do what they have so far failed to do, namely make the necessary serious concessions to reconcile Sunni groups to the political process (including points having to do with federalism, de-Baathification, and so on). Doing this publicly would put "pressure from below" on the party leaders, who otherwise feel no such pressure. Without such serious political restructuring, any troop-increase will only mean more of the same (at best).

The logic is impeccable. Visser says he has submitted this to American newspapers but he isn't optimistic about publication. It makes you wonder, but then again, this is the same question, with the same answer, re Somalia. There is an exciting military story about defeat of the Islamic enemy (or in this Iraqi case an imagined futuristic or Bushistic "victory"). And there is an account of the actual alignment of the political forces and the possibilities for negotiated solutions. The latter isn't talked about in America.

The problem isn't really the military excitement, although it certainly helps circulation. The problem is the predetermined outcome: Details in these media stories have to be arranged and/or suppressed in order to show the way to a predetermined outcome. There is no point introducing other alternatives, because that would only leave readers confused, and take away from the authority of the explainer. While the corporate media do this in a sophisticated way, Juan Cole, the big retail purveyor of Iraq news, does it in a less sophisticated way. Here is part of his December 05 Iraq summary:

In Iraq, both the Jan. 30 [2005] election and that of Dec. 15 [also 2005] cemented Shiite fundamentalist political control of the country. The United Iraqi Alliance, now a coalition of all three major religious and political currents among Iraqi Shiites, had 140 seats (a simple majority) in the Jan. 30 elections, and will likely have 130 seats in the new parliament, such that it can easily form a government that can survive votes of confidence requiring 51 percent support for the prime minister. The fundamentalist Shiites got the constitution they wanted on October 15, enshrining strong elements of Islamic law and ensuring that the southern Shiite provinces will control all future petroleum finds in the oil-rich south.

So as of December 2005, the Shiites had "cemented...political control of the country". As for the Sunnis, here is Cole (Dec 4 2006) following the Hakim meeting with Bush earlier this month in Washington: "Despite his ecumenical speeches in Sunni Jordan last summer, al-Hakim frequently urges a hard line against the 'neo-Baathists' and militant Salafi revivalists,i.e., the Sunni Arabs of Iraq." "The Sunni Arabs of Iraq" = neo-Baathists and militant Salafi revivalists, not a very attractive picture. In the last few days, Cole has somewhat relented, and now admits (now that it is US government policy) that the Sunnis have to be negotiated with, because they are what he calls "spoilers". Here is his reasoning (Dec 27): "The guerrilla war is hotter now than at any time since the US invasion. It is more widely supported by more Sunni Arabs than ever before. It is producing more violent attacks than ever before. Since we cannot defeat them short of genocide, we have to negotiate with them." Now he is making some "ecumenical speeches" of his own, educating his readers about the need for a "win-win situation", even if it involves Sunnis. This is several years late, and his very influential sectarian approach has already done its damage.

Gullible readers who have been exposed for years to this sort of thing are naturally going to be very hard-boiled about any concept of cross-sect Iraqi nationalism. So when I quoted Harith al-Dhari (Sunni head of the Muslim Scholars Association) in Istanbul recently on the subject of Sunni-Shiite cooperation, and a commenter expressed consternation, asking if it isn't the case that the "Muslim Scholars have been blowing up Shiites in Sadr City", the commenter then admitted she was a regular Juan Cole reader.

Whether the predetermined outcome is thought of as US-compliant, or Shiite-controlled, the point is that any such approach drains the content out of the story, leaving the reader with cartoon stick-figures and authoritarian assurances of "Informed Comment".

And so it is that when the country is faced with a president, either delusional or malicious, about to order a troop-increase, the country is unable to mount any kind of a rational discussion about the political underpinnings of it. There are only two available organizing ideas: US-compliant regime (NYT); Shiite-controlled regime with Sunni spoiler-status (Informed Comment). The former seems to imply more troops until the desired US-compliant status is reached; the latter suggests troop-withdrawal, but only because that is a demand of the spoiler-group. Neither one of them starts from an even-handed account of the actual alignment of the relevant political forces. It would only confuse readers. And it would take away from the authority and the authoritarianism of whoever is doing the talking.

Off for a few days, then days will start getting longer

The solstice is upon us. Badger, in keeping with his woodland heritage, will be offline for a few days, returning probably the middle of next week, or thereabouts. Things will start to turn better then, anger and stupidity will dissipate, understanding will prevail. I promise.

American readers finally hear about the Istanbul conference

Aswat al-Iraq says the statements of Adnan al-Dulaimi (head of the Iraqi Accord Front) and others at the Istanbul conference last week triggered a storm of criticism at a parliamentary session yesterday, adding this was only a consultative session with 85 members present, lacking the quorum of half the full membership (which is 275) plus one. Vice-speaker Khalid al-Ateya, referred in particular to a reported statement by Dulaimi about Sunnis being wiped out in Iraq and asking for the intervention of neighboring countries. He said unless Dulaimi apologizes to the people of Iraq for this shameful statement, steps should be taken to revoke his parliamentary immunity. Another member proposed a committee of inquiry to find out what his views are.

The reporter reminds readers that already last week, the official government spokesman Ali al-Dabagh had criticised Turkey for hosting this conference, because statements like these translate into further violence within Iraq.

Salim Abdullah, an Accord Front member who was present at the session yesterday, said Dulaimi's statements at Istanbul were his own personal opinion and not those of the party, whose charter expressly forbids making provocative statements. A member from the UIA (the main Shiite coalition) said you can't make that kind of excuse in th case of the leader of a party. Outside the session a Kurdish member told the reporter members of parliament should be careful not to make the kinds of statements that would highlight internal struggles. A member representing SCIRI (the biggest parliamentary component of the UAI) spoke about the need to restore balance in the institutions of the state. And so it went.

Americans got their first report about the Istanbul conference this morning, via Juan Cole, who (1) called statements of Dulaimi "incendiary", but failed to mention the more enlightened comments that Harith al-Dhari made in rebuttal; (2) quotes a Shiite website that reported allegations about an arrest-warrant against Dulaimi, without telling readers that this was false; (3) failed to pay any attention to the more balanced Al-Jazeera summary of the Istanbul proceedings (mentioned here in a prior post). Cole presents a one-sided account, followed up with something equally incendiary (and false to boot). It is a case study in how to go about taking a contentious event, and instead of explaining the dynamics in an even-handed way, using it instead in a partisan way to fan the flames higher.

The debate you don't hear a word about in America

Al-Jazeera hosted a televised discussion recently following the windup of the Istanbul Conference (Dec 13 and 14), including Adnan al-Dulaimi (head of one of the biggest Sunni political parties), Harith al-Dhari (head of the Muslim Scholars Association) and others. It has posted a brief summary on its Aljazeeratalk.net site (flagged by Abu Aardvark on his website), and the summary goes like this:

First of all, judging from the banners in the background, the recommended English version for the name of the group that organized this is "Global Anti-Agression Campaign", and the AlJazeera summary notes this was really the first-ever meeting bringing together representatives of the Sunni people of Iraqi with representatives of the Sunni populations of surrounding countries. And there was unanimous agreement on the concluding recommendations (see this prior post), but the there was also one major point of disagreement: Is the Iraqi conflict sectarian or is it political?

Dulaimi is quoted as a proponent of the former view, as follows: He said (according to this summary): "[There is a] Shiite Safavid Persian Majousi threat originating in Iran and aiming to consume all of Iraq, and after that neighboring countries including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, by way of reviving the dream of a new Persian empire."

Harith al-Dari disagreed and said this is "a political struggle plain and simple". He said (according to this summary): "There are both Shiites and Sunnis on the one side under a single banner, and on the other side, arrayed against them, is the Occupation along with its Iraqi agents, aiming at the realization of its colonialist aims. [And this is the case] whether or not those [agents] connive with the Iraqi government and its institutions, or with the death-squads and the militias that are supported from outside".

There was a full debate between the two men and their respective supporters. One common agreed point, however, was that the threat that the Iraqi people are facing comes from beyond their borders, whether from over the horizon (America) or from next door. The person writing the summary doesn't take sides explicitly, but it is significant what his next sentence says. It goes like this: "The conference included the directing of a message to the United States of America, to the effect it is inevitably failing in its efforts to uncover fitna between the two groups of believers in Iraq [Sunni and Shiia], and as Harith al-Dhari insisted, the organization of Shiite clerics is the brother of the Sunni [organnization], and they both proscribe the shedding of blood for whatever reason". And he adds that Dhari called on the Shiite clerics to make a corresponding statement of position, with respect to the sectarian militias.

That is the extent of this summary. Clearly the AlJazeera presentation of this gives the last word to AlDhari, and to the view that this is a political struggle, that can't be allowed to turn into a sectarian struggle, and that the primary enemy is the American occupation, whatever may be the nature of the various parties, whether government or sectarian militia, that are in collusion with it.

It is worth considering the nature of this debate, alongside the comparable "debate" in America, on whether the Iraqi situation is "civil war, yes or no". The trick here is that if you can pin the "civil war" label on Iraq (meaning essentially "sectarian conflict"), then in Dhari's terms, this would be seen as no longer a political struggle at all, but a religious war. America would supposedly become a non-combattant, supposedly turning into a humanitarian assistant and peacekeeper. And America's continued involvement would thus be justified. So while there are huge stakes for the Iraqis in correctly understanding what is going on, there are also stakes for Americans. Which is why I repeat: I am spooked by the fact that there is not a word about this conference, or the issues it raises, in any of the American media, or in any of the big, supposedly enlightening blogs either.

This AlJazeera item concludes with some remarks on the mechanics of the Istanbul conference. It is worth highlighting this: The meeting was held in Istanbul, Turkey, because Turkey is a country that enjoys the benefits of democracy, and allows for the free expression of a wide range of opinions. Food for thought.

Sadr thanks Sunni authorities for their statement

On Tuesday of last week, car-bombers killed 70 laborers who were waiting for the chance for day-work, in Tarayan Square, in a Shiite part of Baghdad. As an expression of their outrage over this, a Sunni group including religious authorities issued a statement, described as a fatwa, in which they proscribed killing of Muslims and killing of Shiites in particular. The authorities included people connected with the Islamic Party, with the Muslim Scholars Association, and with something called the League of Islamic Unity, and apparently they were Basra-based. I don't think there was any widespread notice of this at the time, but this morning Al-Hayat says Moqtada al-Sadr sent a delegation to Basra for the purpose of thanking the officials for their statement.

Apparently referring to the same statement, Al-Hayat explains that group of Basra Sunnis, composed not only of religious authorities but of tribal leaders as well, issued a statement in which they denounced "the terrorism to which the Iraqi people are being subjected", and expressed support for the unity or Iraq geographically and with respect to its people. Signatories of this statement included named people representing the Association of Muslim Scholars, the Sunni Waqf (religious endowments agency), the Islamic Party, and a number of others from the Sunni community of Basra.

A spopkesman for the Sunni group warned of the spread of killings in Basra, but said Basra is different from other Iraqi cities, and what has happened in Baghdad won't be transferred here.

A report on this same exchange between the Sadr delegation and the Sunni group was carried by Aswat al-Iraq yesterday, and it said: The (above-mentioned) spokesman for the Sunni group added that there was a meeting between the Sadr representatives and the Sunni group, at which "a spirit of understanding and cooperation prevailed". He said they agreed on the need to support Iraqi unity, and to denounce terrorist operations and "anything that detracts from the unity and the fabric of Iraqi society".

I would like to underline his mention of "the fabric of Iraqi society", because it is the same phrase Al-Dhari used in his rebuttal of the Islamist at the Istanbul conference, when he warned him against turning the meeting into an anti-Shiite event. Shiites, he reminded the Islamist, are "part of the fabric of Iraqi society". (Quoted in this prior post, the last block-quote section at the bottom).

I think it is a good rule of thumb: If there is any reference to "the fabric of Iraqi society", readers of English-language newspapers and readers of the big blogs won't see it reported. I don't know why. We use "fabric" in exactly the same way. What could the reason be?

Too little too late

The most straightforward summary of the "National Reconciliation" meetings on the weekend is in al-Quds al-Arabi this morning. First of all, this wasn't what the name implies, because "reconciliation" means dealing with all aggrieved parties, and in this case very important groups weren't even there. He names: Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq; the Allawi coalition; the Sadrists; the Baath party; and most important of all, none of the factions involved in the resistance were represented, even though these are the groups that have brought to its knees "the occupation project and the political process that [the occupation] gave rise to".

These absences really point up the powerlessness of the Maliki government and of the parties that support it, and their failure to take up genuine ideas and approaches that could in fact lead Iraq out of its current tribulations. [The ecitorialist is talking about true negotiation with the resistance, which would of course involve a commitment to US withdrawal]. Instead, he says, the main practical result of these meetings is to provide pension support for over 350,000 members of the former army, and really what this amounts to is a bribe and an attempt to get them to lean toward support for the government, or at the very least to neutralize them.

This was definitely not a brainstorm of Maliki's or of the governing coalition. They have been consistent opponents of any accomodation to the Baathists, and among the most fired-up proponents of rooting them out, root and branch.

Most likely, says the editorialist, it was the Bush administration, faced with the crisis of its occupation forces, that told Maliki and Hakim to do this, in hopes that it would at least in some measure serve to cut down the size of the reserve army of the resistance. He says probably Baath party leadership didn't oppose this move, after all the money in question is the people's money, and these families are entitled to it. But naturally they will rigorously oppose any cooperation with the government that might suggest itself as a result of this.

IN any event, this pension deal, and the fact that the whole discussion of de-Baathification was left open, are a clear admission of the failure of the whole occupation program, which was led off, immediately after the 2003 invasion, by the dissolution of the army and of the other institutions of the state, the extirpation of the Baath party membes, and the cutting off of the livlihood of millions of Iraqis, a policy, the editorialist adds, that was recommended by Dr Ahmad Chalabi, by Nuri al-Maliki, and by Abdulaziz al-Hakim.

With the weekend measures, the government has admitted the failure of that policy, but the least we can say (the editorialist concludes) is that this is an admission that comes very late.

Anyone missed this?

In case anyone missed it, please take the time to read this, which was posted earlier today, and which a lot of people have found extremely helpful. It's modern Iraqi history washed clean of the American propaganda, without being argumentative about it, and it's essential background for seeing where the current political movements fit.

Year-end summary

It's easy to get confused, and it's important not to. Here is an attempt to help sort through the recent series of events.

I. "POLITICAL RE-ALIGNMENT"

First of all, there is the story of "political realignment" aka "giving Maliki an alternate political base", freeing him from the Sadrists and enabling him to use the state institutions to attack the Mehdi Army, which is the new Public Enemy # 1 of the Bush arministration. The concept of an "alternate political base" was laid out in the famous Hadley memo, which prepared Bush for his Amman meeting with Maliki.

The technical points in this are the following: (1) The core of the new alliance will be the same as the core of the old, namely SCIRI in the south and the two big Kurdish parties in the north, both proponents of their own autonomous regions, and both staunch US allies since day one of 2003. (2) The keys to success will be to attract other Parliamentary groups to the "new base". But to attract other Shiite groups (including Maliki's Dawa party, headed by former PM Jaafari), you would have to overcome Ayatollah Sistani's rule against splitting the Shiites. The ruse there would be to call the new base "extra-parliamentary", so as to avoid having an "official" split in Parliament. But even at that the Dawa party has said no (following a meeting between party head Jaarafi and Syrian vp Sharaa in Damascus last week). (3) In fact the only apparent "success" has been that Tareq al-Hashemi, following his meeting in Washington with Bush, has said he is willing to join a SCIRI-Kurd alliance (for no apparent reason except having bought into the Bush position that the Mehdi Army is in fact Public Enemy # 1. See the comments to a prior post by Reidar Visser, who follows Baghdad politics in some detail; he says the Hashemi move is puzzling at the least).

The tentative conclusion is that "political re-alignment" or the "new base" idea doesn't seem to be working too sell.

II. "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION"

Following the two earlier meetings in this series (for tribes and NGOs respectively) yesterday they finally convened the third and most important of these, for political parties and groups.

The most important point here is who didn't come. Of course the Sadrists didn't come. But here is the other point: The biggest Sunni coalition in Parliament is the Iraqi National Accord (INA), and it is made up of three main parts: Iraqi Peoples Congress, headed by Adnan Dulaimi (who is also head of the INA as a whole); National Dialogue Front, headed by Saleh al-Mutlak; and Iraqi Islamic Party, headed by Tareq al-Hashemi. The first two groups (Dulaimi's Peoples Congress and al-Mutlak's Dialogue Front) boycotted the reconciliation meeting (according to this morning's account in Al-Hayat. So the only major component of the INA that is still playing the game is Hashemi's group (or Hashimi personally, depending on how you look at his relationship to his group).

Armed resistance groups weren't represented, because the US has refused their demand for a commitment to unconditional withdrawal. And the Baath party, which is outlawed as a party, wasn't there, and moreover it said Maliki welshed on a prior commitment to use his presidential powers to roll back de-Baathification. So naturally there wasn't any progress getting any of the resistance groups into the political process. Which wasn't expected anyway. Rather, the news is that the same groups that are staying out of the "new political base" (Sadrists and major Sunni groups) also stayed away from the "reconciliation" meeting.

To put it another way, the parties that boycotted the "reconciliation" meeting are those that have been reported to be working on a nationalist, cross-sect coalition to demand US withdrawal from within Parliament, in opposition to the proposed SCIRI/Kurd-based "new base for Maliki" idea. It is the same alignment of forces. And to put it another way, the "reconciliation" process isn't working too well either.


III. ISTANBUL

See the prior post. This was a meeting that appears to have been spearheaded by Harith al-Dhari, head of the Muslim Scholars Association (subject of the recent arrest-warrant episode), and it brought together Adnan Dulaimi, head of the Iraqi National Accord (see above) and also (via messages) representatives of three mainly domestic armed resistance groups (Islamic Army of Iraq, Revolution of 1920 Brigades, and Army of Mohammed) and of course al-Dhari, all from the Iraqi side, and representatives of Islamist activism from Saudi Arabia and other countries on the non-Iraqi side.

There are two initial points. One is the nature of the English-language coverage of this meeting. Here is the English-language version on the website of Turkish newspaper Hurriyet: Title: Fear of Taliban Presence at meeting on Iraq. Text:

The presence of Sheikh Haris Ed Dari, the leader of the Iraqi Sunni Ulema Committee, at a meeting in [word missing in the text] caused discomfort to Iraqis, religious Sunni leaders and United States officials at a meeting in Istanbul.

The meeting was organized by the "Global Initiative for the Struggle against Militancy", in order to help the people. A number of religious Sunni leaders attended from Iraq, Qatar, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The central Iraqi government and the United States government were concerned that Ed Dari was present because he is believed to have ties with both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Iraqi Shiites and Kurds also hold Ed Dari responsible for the civil war.

In other words, the US disinformation people were working the phones. In the more sophisticated US press, there has been not a single word about the Istanbul meeting. In the main US retail outlets, the approach is not to mention it at all. The coverage of the Istanbul meeting has worked out like this: NYT zero; WaPo zero; "Informed Comment" zero; and so on down the line.

There could be many reasons for the silence, but I would like to focus on just one point: There was an anti-Shiite declaration earlier in the week by a group of 38 Saudis published on a website called almoslim.net. The director of that website was at the Istanbul meeting, and he said his anti-Shiite piece, and this was followed by a rebuttal by AlDhari. Here's how that went: Nasr al-Amr, the website director, said it is important to treat the Shiites "fairly", explaining that a lot of Shiites don't understand what is at stake, and don't understand the root nature of the Iranian threat, so it is necessary to explain this Shiism to the Shiites themselves (as well as to Sunnis). In other words, it is the fundamentalist Christian very graciously offering to convert the Jews. Here's what al-Dhari had to say about that in rebuttal (from the text of the Azzaman account):

Al-Dhari replied to this, warning against turning this conference into a field for stoking jingoist sectarian arrogance via aggressive statements against the Shiites, who are a part of the fabric of Iraqi society. And Dhari called for letting reason and wisdom prevail in discussion this type of issue. And he added: The original crime was the American occupation, and the agents who came with them are from all the sects....[And conversely] many of the tribal leaders in the South are Shiites, and they fight against the government and against the occupation, and the prisons in the North are filled with opponents of the colonial project [meaning Kurds]...

Dhari is saying: No, this is a political issue, not a sectarian one. No wonder there isn't any English language coverage of it.

This is the inexorable US policy. Marginalize Sadr. Marginalize Dhari. Where a reasonable person would encourage the cross-sect opening indicated by both of them, US policy is instead to continue pushing the situation to a conflagration. It will look inevitable. But it will have been the result of US policy, by commission and omission.

The Istanbul Conference

Azzaman devotes a lot of space this morning to coverage of the Istanbul conference of Wednesday and Thursday (December 13 and 14), with a picture of the group. There were around 100 attendees, including politicians, clerics, intellectuals and activists, the reporter says, from Iraq and from outside of Iraq. Following an exibition of photos and videos to indicate the realities of what is occuring in Iraq, the meeting was convened by Abdulrahman bin Amir al-Nuaimi. He said the purpose of the meeting was to link up Sunnis in Iraq and outside of Iraq and to present a clear idea to those outside of conditions that Iraqi Sunnis are facing. He then read a letter from Safr al-Hawali, who is one of the big names among Saudi clerical activists, described by Nuaimi as the original proponent of this type of conference, but prevented from coming to Istanbul for health reasons. The Hawali letter made three points: Necessity for unity of the Iraqi resistance to the occupation; need for organized assistance to Iraqi Sunnis from the Sunni community world-wide; and political efforts to build a new Iraq for all its groups.
Lead-off speaker was Harith al-Dhari, head of the Muslim Scholars Association of Iraq. His main point was that the nature of the current conflict in Iraq is not sectarian but political. The agents who came to Iraq with the Americans belong to different sects, and the problem it is not their sectarian beliefs, but their collusion with the occupation.

He was followed by Salman al-Awda, another of the big names in Saudi Islamist activism, whose main point was the need for Sunni solidarity with the Iraqi Sunnis, and he made a special point of congratulating Turkey for its efforts in this regard, and also for hosting the conference.

Next up was Adnan al-Dulaimi, head of the Iraqi National Accord, biggest of the Sunni coalitions in the Iraqi parliament. He demurred from Dhari's analysis, and said the current conflict in Iraq is at least partly sectarian, and he said Iran is using this sectarian conflict as a way of extending its influence.

The first day concluded with the playing of a taped audio message from a spokesman for the Islamic Army in Iraq. The Azzaman reporter focuses on the tactical side of what he had to say, for instance noting that he said many Sunni strongholds in the south have fallen, and the Safavid threat is now faced by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The Azzaman reporter leaves out the more colorful parts highlighted yesterday in Al-Quds al-Arabi about Ibn al-Alqami and so on.

On Thursday participants heard from Nasar bin Suleiman al-Amr, described as the director of a website called Moslim.net (which is the site that hosted the anti-Shiite declaration of the 38 Saudi clerics last week), and his main point was more clearly sectarian than any of the other participants. He couched it this way: Sunnis should treat Shiites fairly, because some of them don't realize the root nature of the Iranian scheme. Sunnis need to explain Shiism not only to other Sunnis, but to the Shiites themselves.

This was countered by Harith al-Dhari, who spoke next in rebuttal. It is very important, said Dhari, that what we say here not serve in any way to stoke the flames of conflict. And he elaborated on his point that the issues are essentially political ones, having their main origin in the American occupation, and secondarily in the Iranian interference. The Azzaman reporter gives this the longest treatment of any of his summaries.

The conference adopted a list of conclusions and recommendations.

(1) Iraq is of central importance, and throughout its history has been subject to occupation and so on, but a loyal population has always resisted that.

(2) Sunnis elsewhere cannot tolerate what the Iraqis are going through in terms of violation of their territory, sovereignty and rights, at the hands of the occupation, without taking concrete steps to provide Iraq with assistance.

(3) The occupation bears the reponsibility for the slaughter that is occurring in Iraq, in practical terms because it is providing the political umbrella under which this is going on, and in legal terms because the occupation forces' continuing attacks give Iraqis the right to prosecute them under international law.

(4) The Safavid political parties share in the responsibility, both because of their connivance with the occupation generally, and more particularly because of the activities of their militias.

(5) The current political process in Iraq, under the aegis of the occupation, is without legal right.

(6) Criticism of Arab and Islamic governments for their silence about this, their lack of aid to Iraqis, and particularly to Sunnis. These regimes are doing nothing about the aggressive steps of both America and Iran.

(7) Praise for the management of the Iraqi resistance which is the force that has stymied the occupation plans.

This is followed by a list of points for specific action:

(1) Demand that the American occupation forces get out of Iraq, and end any "form or appearance of military presence" in Iraq, and that this be done with appropriate international guarantees.
(2) Demand that Iran end its interference in Iraq, and in particular that it end its support for specific political parties in Iraq.
(3) End the current political process which has been imposed on Iraq by the occupation, and allow the country to return to a political process that is supported by the Iraqis themselves, without foreign interference.
(4) Disarming and disbanding of the militias,
(5) Affirmation of the Arab and Islamic character of Iraq.
(6) Invite the Arab and Islamic regimes to end their policy of thwarting involvement in the affairs of Iraq, and instead adopt consistent policies permitting popular and non-governmental organizations to provide what assistance they can to the people of Iraq.
(7) Set up follow-up committees, with particular reference to the following:

(1) Pressure and negotiate with neighboring regimes to support the Iraqi Sunnis in the danger that they are facing, release prisoners, and work toward the laying of charges under international law against the violations that Iraqis have faced, and bringing those responsible to court.
(2) Material and humanitarian support.
(3) Support for families.
(4) Publicity for what is happening in the country.

The above is the Azzaman summary.

Al-Hayat publishes a much shorter account of the meeting, with the following additional information that isn't in the Azzaman piece:

Al-Hayat says there was talk about a need for solidarity against American-Iranian aggression that is pushing Sunnis out of Baghdad.

Among the armed opposition groups, in addition to the taped message from the IAI, there was also a tape from the Brigades of the 1920 Revolution, and a faxed message from the Army of the Mujahideen.

Among foreign participants, there were presonalities and representatives of parties and groups from Saudi Arabia, Qatar (where convener al-Nuaimi is from), Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey, along with representation from the Syrian "Justice and Growth" party.

Al-Nuaimi, from Qatar, is the person responsible for the convening group, which is called World Campaign for Resistance to Agression. He said the purpose of the conference, planned as the first of a series, isn't to ignite sectarian fitna, but rather to appeal to reasonable Shiites for dialogue to help rescue the country from the foreign plans.

Jaafari visits Damascus; Dawa says no to new coalition idea

Here is the latest news for those following the attempt to create an "alternative political base" for Maliki, in order to exclude the Sadrists and get tough with them. (The basic idea came from the Hadley memo, and it has been confirmed in various ways by those who have since met with Bush. So far there are four parties on board: SCIRI, the two big Kurdish parties, and the Islamic Party (Sunni) of Tareq al-Hashemi). To make the Shiite-split part of this palatable, the idea was or is to call the new alliance "extra-parliamentary".

The latest news is that the Dawa party, which would have had to be an important part of any such restructuring, has said no. Party chief and former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari has been in Damascus since Tuesday, where he has met with the foreign minister Moallem and also with Vice President Sharaa, who made remarks about Syria offering all possible support for the unity and stability of Iraq. The Al-Quds al-Arabi account of the visit doesn't offer any particular reason for the head of the Iraqi Dawa party to be spending a few days in Damascus right now, but on the same page the newspaper reports the party's decision not to go along with the [Washington sponsored] "alternative political base" idea. The paper quotes Haider al-Abadi, a Dawa Party leader who said the party decided an extra-parliamentary group like this isn't necessary, because all of the relevant parties are in Parliament in the first place.

Moqtada expresses support for the Istanbul meeting

Moqtada al-Sadr issued a statement Friday December 15 on the "Assistance for the People of Iraq" conference that was held in Istanbul the 13th and 14th (see this post). Sadr said he is in favor of the conference, "which supports our brothers [the Sunnis], and my whole concern is for the success of meetings like this, [of people] aiming to extricate themselves from the clutches of the occupation and the Baathists...I am ready to attend conferences in support of the Sunnis, those in support of the Shiites, or those in support of Iraq as a whole or indeed of any Islamic country".

Aswat al-Iraq reminds readers of the statements yesterday by government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh expressing regret that Turkey would host such a conference, which he described anti-Iraq.

The reporter offers another excerpt from the Sadr statement: "If I were a scholar qualified to issue fatwas, I would without hesitation ban the killing of our brothers [the Sunnis] in Iraq or outside of Iraq... Whoever does that (Shiite killing Sunni or Sunni killing Shiite) is an enemy of God ...until the day of judgment."

Iraq protests a Sunni gathering in Istanbul, including Dulaimi, Dhari, the IAI, and Saudi and Pakistani clerics

Iraqi government spokesman Ali Al-Dabbagh said today (Thursday December 14) that the Iraqi government is getting ready to lodge a formal complaint with Ankara over the hosting of a conference called "Help for the People of Iraq" currently going on in Istanbul. Elaph.com, which is the only place I have seen any report of this*, says representation includes the following: From the political sphere, Adnan Dulaimi of the Iraqi National Accord, along with representative(s) Islamic Party (which is headed by Tariq al-Hashemi). From the Iraqi non-political sphere, Harith al-Dhari of the Muslim Scholars Association, along with representative(s) of the Islamic Army of Iraq. And from outside Iraq, "religious persons" from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and elsewhere. Dabagh said this meeting sends a "wrong, sectarian message to Iraqis, aimed at drenching the country in blood". Dabagh added this meeting is anti-Iraq, and any neighboring country should avoid holding in on their soil, because by so doing they are taking a position inimical to the people of Iraq. He said it is unfortunate Turkey has permitted this to be held on its soil, and he reminded neighboring countries that the continuation of violence in Iraq will spread to them and will cause them damage.

The Elaph reporter notes that in spite of the Iraqi government's criticism of this conference, it was praised by the Islamic Party, whose head, Tareq al-Hashemi is vice president of Iraq. The Islamic Party statement said this conference is a cry for help in the face of slaughter at the hands of the militias.

The reporter notes that the official government National Reconciliation meeting (the third in the series, this one for political parties and groups) is still scheduled to be held in two days time. A government spokesman repeated hopes for good attendance from those both within and outside the political process. He said Prime Minister Maliki will attend personally, and will present a proposal for carrying out reconciliation measures, but the official didn't elaborate.

*NOTE:
Friday, December 15 there was also this report on the meeting in AlQuds al-Arabi, described here as a meeting aimed at sending a public message concerning the condition of the Sunnis in Iraq.

AlQuds says the Islamic Army of Iraq participated via a taped message from its official spokesman Ibrahim al-Shamari, and the message included a list of proposals: Creation of an international popular Sunni alliance to confront the Safavid criminals; all-out political activities to help the Iraqi Sunni condition; more efforts to publicize the Safavid atrocities; greater efforts to educate the Sunni masses about their creed and the danger represented by Safavid Iran; work on discourse for gatherings and posters and demonstrations and so on; material assistance.

The IAI statement included this: "Ibn al-Alqami [a 13th century Shiite minister in the court of the Sunni caliph of Baghdad, said to have facilitated the invasion of Hulagu Khan] has been reborn in the form of Hakim and Sadr and al-Rubaie [national security adviser] and Jaafari, and Maliki, from among the Magi and the traitors". And the IAI statement criticized Sunnis everywhere for their delay in helping the Sunnis of Iraq, who are being slaughtered day and night by the three-headed daggar of the Crusaders, the Safavids and the Jews.

The AlQuds al-Arabi account includes the remarks, reported above, by the official Iraqi government spokesman Ali Al-Dabbagh criticising the meeting as anti-Iraq.

Saudi Mufti issues lukewarm statement distancing Saudi officialdom from the anti-Shiite statement

The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Sheikh issued a statement that was printed in the Baghdad newspaper Al-Sabah, in which he invited Iraqis to adhere to unity and renounce violence and sectarianism, and his assistant assured the newspaper's reporter by phone that the anti-Shiite statement of the 38 Saudi Sheikhs issued earlier this week doesn't represent position of the Saudi religious hierarchy, but only their personal opinions. The assistant said the Grand Mufti is always calling for unity, and rejects any statements that will cause any more spilling of blood. But the text doesn't indicate any actual criticism of this particular statement of the 38 by the Mufti or his assistant.

The newspaper couples this with a lengthier statement by the head of the Shia Religious Endownments (Waqf) Agency in Iraq, Saleh al-Hidari which actually criticized the statement of the 38, and in no uncertain terms. He said Iraqis of all persuasions and nationalities and religions reject this kind of thing, which springs from the same distorted concepts that form the basis of terrorism in the Arab and Islamic world and everywhere else, adding that these lying and tyrannical ideas were previously unknown in Iraq.

SCIRI's argument against Baker, and its connection with National Reconciliation

The Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada publishes today a lenthy critique by Adel Abdul Mehdi of the Baker report. And since Mehdi (a vice president of the republic, and senior SCIRI official) is thought to be the US favorite for Prime Minister in the next government, it is worth studying.

His overall debating point is that the report appears to have seized on a few superficial points expressive of Sunni concerns about breakup of the country, Iranian influence, and so on, and made that the basis of recommendations, leaving out any broader considerations, and in particular leaving out important historical background. The whole approach, Mehdi says, reminds him of the shortsightedness of the US administration at the time of the Shiite "intifada" of 1991 following the expulsion of Saddam's army from Kuwait, in effect permitting Saddam to suppress it, based on short-term calculations of US interests.

And he says the report's anecdotal remarks about finding an Iranian under every stone, or the risk of Kurdish separation, are indicative of a facile attitude focusing on the danger of national breakup. But while much of the piece is polemical (he notes how few Arabic-speakers there are in the American embassy as another indication of the report's superficiality), there is one specific point that seems to be central.

He says recommendations 26 through 31, on National Reconciliation, are one-sided, meaning they deal only with Sunni concerns. And he says it is a mistake to make those kinds of concessions (for instance on de-Baathification and federalism) as a way of getting groups to put down their arms.

A balanced solution has to be something that aims at the attainment by all groups of their legitimate rights, without encroachment by this group or that...and without letting it come about that the laying down of arms--on whatever side--becomes a reason for imposing a solution or for the attainment [of a particular group] of rights that are not legitimate, under whatever aspect, or for whatever group, whether Shia, Sunni, Kurd or any other.

Here Mehdi is talking about the report's assumption that negotiation with the armed resistance would require concessions in areas like de-Baathification and a toning down or slowing down of federalism. But Mehdi seems to be most particularly concerned with countering any Baker-inspired move to slow down federalism.

Al-Mada concludes its front-page summary of the Mehdi statement as follows:

There is a general orientation in the report aiming at strengthening the central regime (which is recommended by some Arab states and some domestic groups) at the expense of the decentralized and federal regime, which [latter] the Iraqi people have [already] decided on.

Mehdi is referring to the October 11 Parliamentary vote on the law relating to procedures for estalishing federal regions. He says this "general orientation" is dangerous, because:

You cannot play with political and constitutional issues for tactical political purposes, and to please some, without constitutional procedures or a broad national agreement. In this way the report, in trying to correct errors, itself falls into administrative and constitutional and political errors.

The statement in its full version covers almost all of p 12 of the newspaper today, but the central point seems to be: Opposition to any structural concessions to the Sunni resistance as a way of ending their insurgency, and in particular opposition to any tinkering with the results of the October 11 federalism vote.

Fatfatism and its limits

Everyone familiar with the Angry Arab News Service? I mention this because the Angry Arab has coined a term that is going to be quite useful in understanding coming developments in Baghdad politics: Fatfatism, named after Ahmad Fatfat, the Lebanese Interior Minister, associated in the popular mind with an incident of an Lebanese officer serving tea to Israeli officers during the recent war, giving rise to one of the popular chants in the current Beirut demonstrations: "Fatfat, you tough guy, one coffee and one tea", and with the idea of supporting any number of contradictory positions, depending on the moment and the calculation of one's own interests. The Wikipedia discussion page includes remarks to the effect Fatfatism isn't something limited to Lebanon, but is a leading characteristic of a lot of politicians in other Mideast countries too (hence should not be deleted as a Wikipedia entry).

I think we need this concept to understand what the Bush administration is aiming for in Baghdad. It is to be a government with SCIRI and the two big Kurdish parties as the base, but supplemented with Sunni-fatfatist and secular-fatfatist alliances. The exact size and shape of the fatfatist groups remains to be defined (that is of course true by definition), and certainly the reference in the Hadley memo to paying people off with money is not irrelevant here. The concept of fatfatism is particularly useful, because there are groups that will be with the US for structural reasons (Kurdish parties and SCIRI to promote autonomous regions in the north and the south respectively); and there groups that will be with the US for fatfatist reasons, best known to themselves. While on the other side, there will be nationalists who are determined to see the US withdraw its troops, but probably this will not be a magnet for the fatfatists, at least until it becomes clear that the nationalists will win.

You can see right away what the biggest problem is. The ultimate US aim for the south is to split US-friendly SCIRI from the US-enemy Sadrists, but fatfatism will not work here, and the reason is that there is a higher obligation on Shiites (which Ayatollah Sistani periodically reminds them of) not to become divided. And this is all the more of an urgent priority now that a group of Saudi clerics has called for popular anti-Shiite mobilization. So it is hard to see how any government with SCIRI as a key element won't also involve the Sadrists. We could call this "the limits of fatfatism".

Another point. It is easy to forget, but the next (third) meeting in the National Reconciliation process is to be held in a few days (this one for political parties and groups), and Al-Hayat today quotes the head of that process reminding us that resistance groups, opposition Sunni figures still in exile, and others, have been invited, and the government has signaled a positive attitude to things like revising de-Baathification, revising the Constitution, re-hiring Saddam-era law-enforcement people, and so on. The problem here is that if the government was going to revise de-Baathification and so on, it could go ahead and do so. But what it has found out is that this won't make any difference to the armed resistance movements, or to their sympathizers, without a clear US commitment to unconditional withdrawal. And "no withdrawal" is to Bush as "Shiite unity" is to Sistani. It is another example of "the limits of fatfatism".

Perhaps I am abusing the term, but I find it useful.

(Regular readers please note I have made changes and an addition to the prior post, on the anti-Shiite statement of the 38 Saudi authorities, maybe worth another read).

Saudi clerics call for group action against the "US-Persian backed" Iraqi Shiites

A group of 38 Saudi bigshots, including preachers, present and former university professors, and government officials, all of them is some way or other considered to be religious authorities of some description, issued a statement Monday on a Saudi website, which depending on how you read it, either calls for pogroms against Iraqi Shiites, or perhaps stops a short step short of that. And the Najaf authorities have replied angrily that Riyadh should take a resolute position against this.

A Reuters reporter did a summary of sorts in Arabic, and there is an AP version, but both of them left out important parts, perhaps understandably. A commenter kindly sent the link to the original statement. Here is one excerpt I originally saw in Elaph:

After almost four years of the occupation of Iraq, it has become apparent that the aim is the seizure of Iraq jointly by the crusaders and Safavid rafida ("rejectionists", referring to Shiites as heretics), enabling their ambitions in the region, protecting the Jewish occupiers; the elimination of Sunni influence in it [in Iraq]; the deterrence of the Sunna in the region generally; and the creation of a Shiite crescent, the idea and the execution of which they do not conceal. It has come about that Iraq, by virtue of its Islamic and Arab character, and by virtue of its geography, its history and its [natural-resource] wealth is something they wish to dissipate and plunder. Its official division has become a public [plan], and it can be expected to occur at any moment. [Already] the rafida have the south and the main provinces of the center; the Kurds have the north; the Sunnis have what remains in the center.

Here is an another excerpt:

[Sunnis should not stand idly by as their brother Sunnis are killed, tortured and displaced in Iraq, but should] expose the practices of the rafida at every level and every position of every pulpit and gathering and opportunity--more than that, you should call special meetings on this subject, and you should besiege those who toy with Iraq and its people informationally and legally, and you should arouse the concern of the Islamic population to do their duty with respect to them.

On the specific question of jihad:

[The statement says jihad is unquestionably one of the basic ideas in religion] and what has been taken by force can only be recovered by force, and praise God there are among the mujahideen of Iraq wonderful examples of sacrifice and effort in the path of God, who have terrified the enemy and cut down their strength, and we value them for that and may God be pleased with them. However, there have been recent and novel events in the field that have emerged from our struggle, and they [the novelties] are in need of a legal grounding that cannot be found out except by those [clerics] of the divine science, who are more knowledgable, and have longer experience, and have a more fundamental understanding of these novelties, and who understand the reality of the struggle between ourselves and our enemy. And therefore we implore all the mujahideen to put their hands in the hands of the clerics, and not undertake anything without them...

The enemy have the US and Iran and the finances of Iraq behind them, the statements says in another place, and we (Sunnis everywhere) must not let them down. The gist of the whole statement seems to be a call to consciousness-raising about the dangers and the need for action. "What has been taken by force can only be recovered by force," but the ultimate question of jihad or not should be left to local religious authorities. But the underlying threat of spontaneous popular action is there.

In any event (according to the above-linked Elaph account today) that is the way the Shiite leadership in Najaf read the statement. Acting collectively, they issued a statement accusing these 38 Saudi sheikhs of "legitimizing the taking of blood and property and money of the Shiites". And the Najaf statement called on the Saudi authorities to take a "resolute position against the statement."

Al-Quds al-Arabi points out that the 38 do not include the popular preachers that have regular programs on Saudi state TV. So this is not yet a national cause. On the other hand, it remains to be seen how the Saudi government reacts to the call to take a resolute stand against the 38.

While it is understandable if Arab media turn away from publishing a statement like that of the 38, you do have to wonder how much of what is going on in the region is getting through to the US "policy makers". The NYT this morning buries a reference to this deep inside a story about Washington diplomacy, something they really like to write about.

Dollar-dipomacy to split the Shiites: Will it work this time?

There has been an outpouring of statements by various Baghdad politicians announcing their agreement to join together in a new alliance described as non-sectarian and for the good of the country and so on. In fact, by my count, someone from everywhere on the parliamentary spectrum except the Sadrists has expressed support for this, including people in SCIRI, Kurdish parties (the two big ones), Dawa (Maliki's party), the Islamic Party (big Sunni party), Iraqi List (Allawi's party), and Iraqi National Alliance (the umbrella parliamentary alliance of the Sunni parties).

Associated Press, which is a wonderfully reliable indicator of covert Washington spin in cases like this, said this is an attempt to "oust Maliki". Others have said it is merely an attempt to provide him with an alternative political base so that he can get tough with the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army. What's actually happening ?

We have a couple of unusually helpful clues to work with.

First let's take another look at the Hadley memo. (Hadley to Bush, just ahead of his Amman meeting with Maliki). Hadley wrote: "We could help him [Maliki] form a new political base among moderate politicians from Sunni Shia Kurdish and other communities. Ideally, this base could constitute a new parliamentary bloc that would free him from him current narrow reliance on Shia actors."

Hadley also wrote: "We would likely need to use our own political capital to press moderates to align themselves with Maliki's new political bloc".

And among the other possible US support efforts, Hadley mentioned this:

Consider monetary support to moderate groups that have been seeking to break with larger, more sectarian parties, as well as support Maliki himself as he declares himself the leader of the bloc and risks his position within Dawa and the Sadrists.

This morning Al-Hayat quotes remarks by Hakim in London (on his way back to Baghdad from his talks in Washington with Bush) that included an assurance that the current inter-party discussions are "a natural thing to try and deal with the escalating threats", and not an attempt to replace Maliki. Someone asked him about the implication that the United Iraqi Alliance (the pan-Shiite parliamentary coalition, including SCIRI and the Sadrists among others) could end up being split over this. Hakim replied:

[SCIRI] is dedicated to the unity of the United Iraqi Alliance. ...Many efforts have been undertaken to split the UIA, involving the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars [but this has been] without success.

Lest we forget, or more likely lest we were never made aware of it in the first place, this isn't the first Washingon attempt to ally itself with SCIRI (and the Kurds) and ditch the Sadrists at the same time.

Following the general elections of December 2005, the UIA picked Jaafari (Dawa, and incumbent Prime Minister, supported by Sadr) to be its candidate for Prime Minister in the new government. Khalilzad was furious, and he threatened the UIA with dire consequences if they named anyone but the SCIRI candidate for this: Here is what the Elaph reporter said at the time (early February 2006):

[Informed Iraqi sources] added that the ambassador [Khalilzad] sent a message to the UIA leadership to the effect that in the event they nominated anyone other than Adel Abdul Mehdi of the four candidates [i.e., the four UIA candidates for PM]...he would work for the establishment of an opposition front in Parliament [that would be able to outvote the UIA].

Moreover, the journalist went on, still citing his Iraqi sources:

The sources explained that in the event they [the UIA] nominated someone other than Mehdi, Khalilzad was issuing indirect threats to the effect he would create a number of problems and put down obstacles in the way of such a government, thwarting its aims, and forcing it to resign, [and this would be followed by creation of a non-UIA government based on the coalition Khalilzad was threatening to create].

Why Mehdi?

The journalist said this move by Khalilzad was based on the "Western and regional agenda" aimed at thwarting "Shiite hegemony" in Iraq, adding that in the case of Mahdi, there was an "unwritten agreement to diminish the Iranian influence" in Iraqi affairs. This point wasn't elaborated on.

The eventual choice, Maliki, represented a compromise between Jaafari, who was seen as too close to Sadr, and Mehdi, who is pure SCIRI. This was the best Washington could do at the time.
According to the NYT, the Washington favorite is still Mehdi. And needless to say, we still don't really know the the true nature of the love that unites Washington with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

(We do know something about the love that unites Washington with Mehdi personally, and a commenter provides a link to this useful summary of his economic-policy "credentials"-- aggressive on oil-sector legislation, foreign-investment policy, and so on. But SCIRI is an Iranian creature, so where does Iran fit in. That we don't know).

Familiar music

Saudi mover and shaker Mamoun Fandy disappointed his some of his fans this morning by putting off analysis of the Baker-Hamilton report, but probably he pleased others with a Saudi re-mixing of the racism story: The problems in Iraq and the region are the combined fault of dictatorship and race. Not Saudi dictatorship, Saddam dictatorship; and not Arab race, but, well, he's a little vague on that today. Baker-Hamilton showed laudable self-criticism, he says, but with he Mideast region "under the dark clouds that will rain death upon us", what do we hear, he asks, except some of the people singing that they are the scions of the Pharaohs, others that they are Babylonians, still others that they are sons of the Phoenecians, or of the Caananites. What an irony! (Fandy writes). What a contrast between a miserable and hateful present and a supposedly proud past! Fandy does not tell us in so many words, but clearly it is those Babylonians you have to keep your eye on.

If we are really the offspring of these proud races, says Fandy, whence the Iraqis that are killing each other whence the Lebanese that are insulting one another on television? Resorting to his famous wit, he says: They did not come from outer space! Nor did the Americans bring them with them when they came.

No, says Fandy. "The Americans let the spirits out of the bottle, but it did not create them."

In Iraq, these evil spirits of hatred and intolerance both pre-existed and even flourished under the concealing blanket of the Saddam dictatorship. That they burst out into the open when America removed the blanket is no surprise. It was the removal of the blanket that was America's only "unforgivable error". This is followed by quite a nice riff on "dictatorships and totalitarian concepts", referring to Communism and to Saddam, regimes that cover racial problems over, but don't end them. In Iraq, the problem was that Saddam tried to relocate Shiite Arabs to the Kurdish north, and northerners to the south, which is "different racially and by sect", so when Saddam was removed, people wanted to move back. There is a brief excursus on the dictatorial mind, "fictive and deceptive", then this: "The scandals we face now are the direct result of this deceptive mind". And if the people in Lebanon want to know what is in store for them all they have to do is look south to Palestine (where Fandy's Saud-family patrons are leading supporters of the Fatah faction); and if Hamas wants to know where their "rejection of the reasonably possible" will lead them, they have only to look to Iraq (where race and the prior Saddam dictatorship are apparently to blame). It is almost as if Fandy wasn't expecting anyone to actually read this, or perhaps more to the point it is as if what matters is the music of the language and the authoritative key-signature, and the vague and sometimes not-so-vague racism, perhaps the kind of thing you can get in America by reading a days' worth of Matt Yglesias Iraq blog-postings or... You can take your pick, I guess. It is not as if Fandy is actually harping in this particular column on the issue race. His aim here is to merely exonerate America by the tautological method. "Bin Laden and Saddam and Moqtada al-Sadr are us, " he says, launching into a whole series of these "they are us!" clauses. He exclaims in conclusion: "Our future is linked to our past!" It is not as if power-politics had anything to do with it.

Anyway it is a very popular way of looking at things these days. Matt and Mamoun should form a Saudi American friendship committee and organize conferences on this. Maybe somebody already has.

Two versions of the struggle, post-Baker

Post-Baker statements were issued this weekend by the Islamic Emirate of Iraq, and by the Baath party, both of which statements focus on defining their respective movements from the point of view of ultimate political aims, a trans-national "project" on the model of the caliphate on the one side, and traditional Iraqi national unity on the other. Each group is concerned that it not be deprived of the fruits of its struggle, by those who don't share in these ultimate aims.

The Islamic Emirate media office issued a statement on the Baker-Hamilton report, calling it an admission of defeat in Iraq. But the issue now, says the statement, is who is to reap the fruits of this. Baker-Hamilton, with its call for regional involvement, is the modern version of the Sykes-Picot agreement of almost a century ago, and the point is to limit the extent of any Islamic entity to within fixed and limited national limits. It doesn't even occur to many Muslims, this statement says, to think of an Islamic political organization that extends beyond that, "from China to Spain".

The statement says:

This conceptual shortcoming isn't found only among ordinary Muslims, but extends even to some of the groups that raise the banner of jihad, and in fact that is what the American administration is now betting on, because in the past the colonial crusader-regimes have succeeded in making sure that it is the nationalists that reap the fruits of the jihadi islamist revolutions, as in the cases of Lybia, and Algeria, and other cases. When will the ummah learn that lesson, and when will it finally learn to benefit from the experiences of history?

The statement concludes that the US administration has failed in its attempt to form a government of "Safavids, some traitors from among the tribes, and some Sunni claimants to the political process". But it warns of the next US manoeuver, which will be to rely on "those of limited understanding, to thwart any experience of an Islamic state project in Iraq on the model of the Caliphate." In other words, in a nutshell, they think the Americans are going to try to come to some agreement with the nationalists, in order to thwart the islamists. The trick now will be to make sure the the fruits of the struggle aren't taken away from the mujahideen by "the climbers and the opportunists". (This follows by a few days a specific call by the Islamic Emirate for Muslim Scholars Association head Harith al-Dhari to desist from his negotiating tours in the Arab world which included talks with the Jordanian king at the time of the Bush-Maliki meeting).

The Arab Socialist Baath Party, which issued a statement Saturday on what comes after Baker-Hamilton, makes three main specific points: The first is that there should be no negotiation with the occupation authorities until they agree to the conditions that have been laid down previously, the main one being commitment by the US to complete and unconditional withdrawal. The statement refers to unnamed persons who have had discussions with the US, as unauthorized persons "on the margin, and isolated" within the broad area of the resistance, stressing that the resistance won't even define who is the authorized bargaining agent until the US has first agreed to the prior conditions. So that is the first point: No negotiations until complete and unconditional withdrawal is agreed on.

The second point in the Baath declaration is that a careful reading of Baker-Hamilton shows that its main aim is to gain time so as to come up with a new military and political strategy for continuing US occupation of Iraq, via an undetermined period of time when the forces would be withdrawn out of cities and into bases in non-urban areas. In other words the armed struggle will continue until either the US agrees to the terms, or is driven out, so there should be no letting up militarily.

The third point focuses on the combination of threats from the US and Iran. The general description of the situation refers to a type of US-Iranian "agreement" under which for instance the US turned over the central government to Iranian-oriented groups, and refers tacitly to US-Iranian agreement to try and undermine the Arab nature of Iraq, each for its own ends. There is a long list of "in the light of..." clauses, including reference to US-Iranian forced relocation campaigns and so on, and also this: "In the light of the possibility of the US and Iran agreeing to organize a mass-destruction military campaign against Arabs of Iraq, particularly in the liberated areas, which American newspapers have published some information about", there is a bigger need than ever for unity and preparedness for greater battles ahead. In other words, for the Baathists, the US-Iranian collusion so far has been limited to domestic-political arrangements in Iraq, but there is a danger that this could be upgraded to a military attack on those areas of Iraq that aren't controlled by either the US or Iran.

For the Baath party, the ultimate US-Iranian purpose is to "dissolve the Arab character of Iraq, and convert it into dwarf city-states that would be clients of the one side or the other (US or Iranian). The resistance aim is the national unity and Arab character of Iraq. Moreover the Iraqi struggle is the decisive one for the whole Arab world, because if the US loses in Iraq, then its power elsewhere in the region will be destroyed. The statement describes the current Lebanon crisis, for instance, as an artificial crisis designed to boost Iran's popularity in the Arab world.

The Baath party statement is available here. English language version here.

The Emirate also issued a version of its statement in English, such as it is, here. For the Arabic version, I used this summary in Al-Quds al-Arabi.

The 2003 generation seems to be planning a comeback

For some reason, the Allawi-Chalabi era US-allied would-be political leaders are again running themselves up the flagpole, or whatever that expression is.

Yesterday there was the Elaph report on Faisal al-Kaoud, supposedly the leading candidate for new Defence Minister. He was in exile from 1971 to 2003.

As for Allawi himself, Marc Lynch notes that he has been burnishing a nationalist anti-US image lately, giving interviews, and appearing frequently on Arab TV, suggestive of a candidacy for something, in the context of the decline of general confidence in the Maliki administration.

Then there's another name, this one almost as unfamiliar as al-Kaoud's, that surfaced yesterday. And since it is a small world, this additional name belongs to an Allawi-ally/Chalabi rival.

We all remember Chalabi, but there was Janabi too. Saad Assim Abboud al-Janabi, scion of an Iraqi tribal and business family, exiled in California for eight years, returning to Iraq with the Americans. US News printed a profile of Janabi in June 2003, noting he was setting up a political party, and suggesting he could be a rival to Chalabi for top spot in the new political order under the Defence Department's Iraq coordinator Jay Garner. But Chalabi was given control of the de-Baathification process, and that apparently disqualified Janabi, who had ties to Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamel. (Janabi was also outed by Judy Miller as someone who had worked with the CIA, but that is another story). The point is that the two, Chalabi and Janabi were rivals then.

And it appears they are coming out of the woodwork to fight again. Janabi, it seems, has been using a pair of offices in Zawiyya district of Baghdad that actually belong to the Iraqi Finance Ministry. His occupancy was authorized for a year back in 2003 by Paul Bremer, but the authorization has long expired, and apparently Janabi is still there.

Yesterday the office of the Presidency of the Republic (Talabani's office) issued a statement to the effect it is planning to move into those offices soon, and reciting the history of its unsuccessful attempts to evict Janabi. Apparently former president Iyad Allawi (with whom Janabi is close) had complained about last-resort police attempts to evict Janabi, and Talabani replied with a recital of all of his efforts to do this legally. This is obviously a potential embarassment to Janabi.

Here's where it gets kind of interesting. Chalabi's former research director, Nibras Kazimi (see the thumbnail bio under "scholars" on the Hudson Institute website, not only draws attention to this squabble on his web-site, (Dec 9, "Would-be Iraqi Intelligence Chief...") but suggests this could harm Janabi in some specific ways, citing in a very Chalibi-esque way a supposedly lucrative contract between a California-based firm with which Janabi is associated and the government of Iraq, and suggesting that this dust-up over the eviction proceedings could harm Janabi's and this company's credibility. And there is this:

Janabi, says Kazimi, has been going around saying he will be next director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. This eviction-scuffle could hurt that ambition too, Kazimi says.

Recall the exciting story last month of the current director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, al-Shehwani, being airlifted to Amman by the Americans for his own safety, following an assassination threat. At about that same time, there was a report in the Baghdad newspaper Azzaman that said US intelligence chief Negroponte suggested to Maliki the creation of a whole new intelligence service, and suggested also there would be no objection to including officers from the Saddam-era intelligence service in the new outfit. The reporter says people in the Shiite UIA opposed that idea. So this might or might not just be a Chalabi-Janabi personal squabble.

There you have it. At least four candidates so far for high position in an Iraqi government of some description, all of them US-allied 2003-returnees: Al-Kaoud, Allawi, Janabi--and Chalabi himself.

Because here we have the answer to another puzzle. I complained when the NYT printed its Chalabi profile last month that the paper forgot to mention anything about Chalabi's lead role in de-Baathification, or about his plans (reported in Al-Quds al-Arabi), to start up a new "liberal-type" political party. He's keeping a low profile.

UIA described as wary of coup-possibilities if a leading candidate is named new Defence Minister

Elaph, citing unnamed Iraqi sources, says a former governor of Al-Anbar province and a tribal leader, Faisal al-Kaoud, is the leading candidate to become Minister of Defence in the cabinet shuffle Prime Minister has promised. This is not necessarily to be taken at face value, but it is interesting as the first specific prediction. The Elaph reporter reminds us that the whole Iraqi-military issue was the top item in the recent Bush-Maliki talks in Amman so naturally this will be closely watched.

Elaph says Faisal al-Kaoud, 60, a Sunni Iraqi, fled Iraq in 1971 after a relative was executed by Saddam for allegedly plotting a coup, and returned to Iraq following the US invasion. Elaph's first comment is that al-Kaoud is accepted by many Iraqi groups, "and by the multinational forces, which he has criticized for their handling of [Iraqi] security, and the criticism included a promise that he [al-Kaoud] would be able to restore security to Anbar province in the space of six months if he were to assume the Ministry of Defence, and if he were permitted weaponry superior or at least equal to what Al-Qaeda has, and what is in the possession of the armed organizations that oppose the political process in Iraq, (meaning the resistance).

Just to make sure you know where Elaph stands, the reporter adds that its sources said al-Kaoud is possessed of a bold personality that isn't sectarian, and that his political group, something called Council of Iraqi Solidarity, is a group that includes Sunnis and Shiites too, adding that al-Kaoud was a founding member of the Anbar Rebirth Council, which gave rise recently to the Anbar Salvation Council. The reporter says the latter group has participated in the killing and arrest of a large number of AlQaeda fighters in Anbar, and controls a lot of territory in Anbar, hoping to eventually control the whole province. The group has the support of the Iraqi government, but as far as weaponry is concerned, this reporter says the following: Sheikh Sattar Bazigh abu-Rashia says the US forces have barred the group from using anything but light weapons in its operations.

Al-Kaoud, who is 60, served as governor of Anbar until summer of 2005 (no information on when or how his term started), and in late 2005 he presented his name as a candidate for presidency of the republic (a post that doesn't necessarily require status as a member of parliament), but this was quixotic. He had also been a candidate for Minister of Defence in the prior Jaafari administration, before this post went to Saadoun Dulaimi.

Getting down to the politics of any eventual appointment, the Elaph reporter says this: People in the governing United Iraqi Alliance would prefer that the Ministry of Defence not go to "someone with ambitions or who has popular or tribal bases of support, fearing later use of this in overthrowing the government". On the other side of the aisle, people in the Iraqi National Accord, the biggest Sunni political coalition, would prefer (this reporter says) someone whose views are closer to their own. In any event, says this reporter, both sides (UIA and INA) want the two ministries of Defence and Interior to be alloted according to the sectarian division.

Finally, the reporter says his sources admitted there are other candidates too for Defence Minister, and they mentioned Wafiq al-Samarae, security adviser to Talabani and a former head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service [I believe under Saddam]; and Mithal Alousi head of something called the Iraqi Nation Party. But the source said al-Kaoud is the most likely of the three.

The reporter says Maliki hasn't yet indicated which ministries will be involved in the changes, and there is still the question whether or not this will continue to be on a sectarian-allocation basis. In terms of timing, the reporter observers expect the changes to be announced after the National Reconciliation meeting, now scheduled for December 17. This meeting, the reporter notes, is expected to include some of the "opponents of the political process that have been invited by government delegations [in meetings with them] in Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates".

"There will come a person after Bush, who will try to put this [Iraq] investment to profitable use"

Syrian vice-president Farouk al-Sharaa made remarks in an interview with the Syrian electronic newspaper Champress.com that are worth noting for a number of reasons, and this is a case where the commenters at Syriacomment.com (apparently mostly themselves Syrians except for the owner of the site, Josh Landis, who posted translations of parts of this) have been able to actually make their discussions meaningful enough so that even I could understand the relevance to the bigger world.

Sharaa was foreign minister until late 2005, when he was either demoted or promoted to vice-president, but in any event he is the first senior Syrian official to comment on the post-Baker situation. So that is one point.

Landis describes Sharaa as a hard-liner. His predecessor as vice-president, Khaddam, defected and is now leader of an exile opposition group. His successor as foreign minister, Muallem, is the relatively friendly face of Syrian foreign policy, a role Landis calls that of the "good cop". So the emergence of the hard-liner Sharaa as spokesman now, suggests "the regime leaders are taking him out of mothballs in order to initiate a 'bad-cop' phase," suggesting increased self-confidence across the board, with respect not only to Lebanon, but with respect to Palestsine and Iraq too.

Much of his interview is taken up with an explanation and defence of Syria's regional policy since Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Syria sided with Saudia Arabia and Kuwait in that case, even though it wasn't a popular position at home, but it was a consistent one: Countries shouldn't be occupied by other countries. The principle is exactly the same with respect to Iraq. Syria has told all of the successive Iraqi leaders that it won't support any government in Iraq that doesn't oppose the occupation: It told Allawi that, then it told Jaafari that, and it has told Maliki that too.

With respect to the idea of an international conference on Iraq, Sharaa said that has been suggested by a number of European representatives that have visited Damascus recently, and the Syrian position is the following: "A lot of the proponents of this idea haven't spelled out what would be the actual purpose. Syria would like to know that the proposed aim of the discussions would be, so that the conference isn't just for the sake of having a conference, but would have specific aims that have a chance of being realized".

Turning to Palestine, Sharaa said the West has blockaded and is starving an entire people, and is preventing the Arabs from helping them, all because of the capture of one Israeli soldier. This is something unheard of even in the days of slavery. (With respect to Palestine, and also Iraq and Lebanon, Sharaa asks: What is "extremist" about supporting the idea of a government of national unity).

As for the United States, Sharaa says the American people are coming to realize there has been fraud with respect to the Iraq policy, and the best evidence of that fraud to date is the Baker-Hamilton report. The US has failed in its occupation project in a sweeping way, and this is an opportunity to correct the policy, even though it is very late. But Sharaa says any actual changes will probably be insignificant.

Asked about the Baker recommentation about involving Iran and Syria in the Iraqi process, Sharaa said: "We don't support just any political process [with respect to Iran] no matter what the aim. We support a process based on the unity of Iraq both with respect to its people and its geography, based on national reconciliation involving all Iraqi groups, and based on a timetable for withdrawal [of the occupation forces]".

In the Syriacomment.com treatment of this, there is a lot of detailed allusion to the ins and outs of the Syria-Lebanon-Hizbullah relationship. But there is also something else in these remarks of Sharaa of a more general nature, more easily graspable by people who aren't from the region. Champress concludes its summary of the interview this way:

Sharaa said, "We hope there will be fundamental change in the American policy with the advent of the Democrats, but if one wants to be realistic--and we are--any change will be very small, and in the worst case superficial, and in the worst of the worst cases [merely] tactical. And he added, "This whole approach of dealing with pressure by pretending it isn't really pressure, suggests that American policy is likely going to remain just as it is.

And Sharaa warned that although the majority of the American people are against the occupation project, still there is a sector "that is influential and that thinks that having spent $450 billion it isn't possible to leave with empty hands. There will come someone after Bush that will undertake to put that investment to profitable use...For our part, we are against having Iraq dragged into a situation where it has to pay the bill for the forces that invaded it."

I have highlighted the overall political message for Americans that is implicit in these Sharaa remarks, because something struck me while I was preparing the prior post (yesterday) on the Samaha article. It is that this kind of broad analysis of American policy is something that, in recent memory, you would have expected to hear developed and propounded by the American left. Where has it gone? I thought the brothers and sisters might be interested in reflecting on that point.

Samaha: America still dangerous, despite all the recent rhetoric

Joseph Samaha, writing in Al-Akhbar, lays out the skeptical view of all the recent "changes" in the American political scene: replacement of Rumsfeld by Gates, who said there can't be "victory in Iraq"; the Baker report talking about "withdrawal"; and all of the vast rhetoric that has surrounded this.

He says probably what it all comes down to is "a restructuring of the occupation, and a revision of the relationship with the surrounding countries." He develops the idea as follows:

Iraq destroyed the American presumptions, but at the same time Iraq itself is in conflagration, and the priority now is to control the flames, knowing that there are those at work trying to stir the embers in Lebanon. The American imperial enterprise in Iraq, dressed up in the robes of the Archbishop [talking about the rhetoric about democracy], has been blocked, but that doesn't imply development of any critical or radical approach involving of examination American foreign policy with respect to its traditional and secure basis; or examining the position of America the shining beacon to all nations; or even any examination of war itself. What has happened is that there has developed an attitude of opposition to failure, opposition to the expense, opposition to the bearing of responsibility... This is precisely what the Americans gave voice to in the recent mid-term elections. It is no longer possible for George Bush to continue with his reckless ignorance; it has become necessary to make an accomodation with reality. But whether [you look at] the president's talking about tactical changes, or any of the other limited detours of strategy, what is clear is that nothing will change. There have been many lead-ins to change, for instance the Baker-Hamilton report with its appropriate PR and media fanfare worthy of Hollywood....

In fact we could say that the dismissal of Rumsfeld was the first of a series of preventive measures aimed at warding off criticism, and starting the search for ways of controlling the flames, and of finding an exit from this scene of crimes with the least possible losses. It is an expression of the fact that American power and the defence of its strategic interests are no longer consistent with "victory in Iraq" much less with its spread to elsewhere in the region. Rather, [American power] is consistent [only] with a restructuring of the occupation, and a revision of the relationship with the surrounding [countries]

Samaha has specific doubts about any idea that Robert Gates in particular (the new Defence Secretary) represents anything but damage-control. His Lebanese readers will probably have understood the Lebanese sub-text of this from the beginning, but for the rest of us, Samaha has this to say at the end:

The question remains open, whether Bush will conduct any real re-examination, or whether Condoleeza Rice will permit any revision in her calculations respecting the transfer of the Iraq experience to Lebanon, where she has seen [during the war with Israel] "the birth-pangs of a New Middle East".

Which is Samaha's way of saying he isn't sure whether Washington will continue its policy of fomenting division and polarization. He concludes:

It isn't clear whether Gates will be "influential", but what we do know is that he is the "designated" person. [A play on words in Arabic that loses a lot in the translation. The gist of it is we can't be sure whether there will be policy-change or not]. What this means is that it would be advisable for the government to take another look at its reliance on its "friendly relations" with Washington; but it would also be advisable for Hizbullah not to wager on any fundamental change in American policy either.

Kurds and Israelis unhappy with the turn of events

Kurdish television said that a leader of one of the two big Kurdish parties (Barzani's party, the other is led by Talabani) urged Kurdish leaders to declare the independence of Kurdistan as of this coming March 21, which is new-years. The official, who is also Minister of Culture in the Kurdistan regional government, said such a move would "strengthen the Kurdish position in the regional calculations," and he said: "The treatment of Kurdistan by the central [Iraqi] goverment has not been in keeping with the contributions that we have made to the political process in Iraq, moreover the American administration aims at disregarding the Kurdish importance in local and regional equations. For these reasons, it is incumbent on the Kurdish leadership to go to the Kurdish parliament and have the Kurdish people declare, via their elected representatives, the realities that exist on the ground, and [declare] that they are raising the threshhold of their demands to independence." This report, on the website of KNNTV, notes however that he added: It is not necessary that they declare indendence hastily, but rather that they confirm that that this is a right of the Kurdish leadership".

The report explains that this was an expression of Kurdish anxiety over the fact that Bush invited Hakim (Shiite) and Hashimi (Sunni arab) to have strategic discussions in Washington, something seen as a marginalization or disregard of Kurdish interests. It preceded release of the Baker report.

Since the issuance of the Baker report, I haven't found expressions of official Kurdish reaction however you can perhaps get the flavor of the reaction from the title of this piece on Kurdmedia.com: Is Baker an American or a Turk, complaining that the report takes a one-sided approach to the PKK-Turkish conflict, and had nothing to say on the theme of Kurdish self-determination.

(ADDED NOTE: Since posting this, the Elaph Iraq reporter Osama Mahdi, who never sleeps, filed a report that included statements by Kurdistan president Barzani critical of the report. Barzani said at a press conference in Erbil that the Baker commission didn't visit the Kurdish region, and didn't listen to the opinions of Kurds. He adds that of the $20 billion the US has spent on Iraq, only $600 million was spent in Kurdistan. Barzani said there will be a joint commission (apparently meaning including all the Kurdish parties) that will start meeting within the month and will draw up a list of projects they will ask the US to implement. He also said he opposes any quick US troop-withdrawal. Even though there aren't any US troops in Kurdistan, he said, a quick withdrawal from elsewhere would have a negative effect on the country.

The Elaph report says another government spokesman said a detailed critique will be issued soon.)

The other dissent comes from Israel, where Prime Minister Olmert rejected the idea of any linkage between Iraq and the Israel-Palestine issue.

(The above-noted Elaph account says SCIRI leader Hakim also criticized the Baker report for including the idea of linkage between Iraq and the Palestinian question, thus rounding out the trio of staunch supporters of the existing Bush policy: Kurdistan and SCIRI, the two proponents of strong federal regions; and Israel in the background).

At the other end of the Mideast spectrum of opinions, Al-Quds al-Arabi said in its lead editorial that the Baker report was "useful" because it constituted the first admission of American defeat in Iraq and the need to withdraw. But the editorialist complained on three points: (1) The report failed to focus on the need to negotiate with the resistance. He says it is the resistance, in all of its various groupings, that has been responsible for the failure of the occupation project, and you don't solve a situation like that until you quit fighting and talk. He cited the experience of the British with the IRA. (2) The focus on a role for Iran and Syria showed a dangerous lack of attention to the position of the (other) Arab regimes in the area, particularly considering the Iraqi government is already pro-Iranian and has failed to create anything but a sectarian administration. (3) With respect to Palestine, the failure to say anything about "Israeli terrorism" and the US administration's tacit acceptance of that, gives the impression that this was merely a pro forma repetition of generalities.

Breakthrough in US-Iranian relations on Iraq and the nuclear issue ?

There are at least two reports this morning about a relationship between the Hakim-Bush visit and the overall US-Iran relationship. Al-Hayat cites Washington sources who said Hakim delivered to Bush a letter from the Iranian president Ahmedinejad, but the only information about the content is that Iran proposes that the US acknowledge that Iran has a role to play in Iraq. The reporter then goes on to say that Hakim suggested he could be an intermediary between Washington and Tehran. There were discussions about the need to dissolve the militias, Bush pointing out that they (he and Hakim) have a mutual interest in controlling the militia of Moqtada al-Sadr, but adding that SCIRI's own militia, the Badr Corp, is also a problem. Al-Hayat doesn't return to the Iranian letter with any further details or speculation.

There is a more elaborate treatment of possible developments in the US-Iran relationship in Al-Quds al-Arabi. The centerpiece of the Al-Quds account is the Talabani visit to Tehran last week, and its possible connection to the current Hakim visit to Washington. Baghdad political people say Talabani was told by Ahmadinejad that we [Tehran] will bring the militias under control and you will be hearing news that will please you. Iraqi foreign minister flew immediately to Amman, where Maliki was to meet with Bush, to inform him of this, and the news is described as having had an indirect effect on the Bush Maliki talks in Amman.

Next there is this description of how the talks were (according to this account) enlarged to include not only Iraq, but also the nuclear question. The narrative goes like this: In preparation for his visit to Tehran, Talabani met with Khalilzad and with Hakim. Hakim sent sent senior SCIRI people and vice-president Adel Abdul Mahdi to Tehran to discuss views and attitudes in a preparatory way, "respecting Iraq, and [respecting] the enlargement of the new deal between Washington and Iran to include the nuclear issue".

The reporter says an Iraqi government source told him: The Hakim visit to Washington was related to this Talabani discussion in Tehran, and it is a discussion that is continuing in an indirect way between Tehran and Washington respecting Iraq. The reporter says it was this breakthrough in Tehran that led Hakim to take on a role in this, being the Iraqi politician closest to Iran. The idea of Hakim's visit to Washington was decided on the spot, and the reporter says this Hakim-Bush visit is part of "the proposals that were put forward by Khalilzad in Baghdad (apparently referring to the meeting with Hakim mentioned in the preceting paragraph above). The sources told the reporter Hakim brought with him to Washington proposals (from Tehran) relating to the new American strategy in Iraq, the Iranian role, and the Baker-Hamilton proposals. (This part dovetails with the Al-Hayat account referred to above).

The rest of this account cites unnamed "observers" and "analysts" in Baghdad, including these points: The Iranian "admission" of its relation to the Iraqi militias means there will have to be a long process of confirmation of good faith on both sides; Hakim probably wants guarantees that in the event of unexpected changes in US policy, his group will not be disadvantages or embarrassed. Finally, he says the experts point out that any "nuclear" dimension to the recent talks is limited, because it would depend first of all on the evolution of the European Union activities in this regard, and secondly it would be subject to a lot of detailed back-and-forth between Tehran and Washington. But what these recent developments do mean, the reporter says, it that they open up at least the possibility of a comprehensive agreement that could resolve not only Iraqi security but the Iranian nuclear issue at the same time.

One overview of the crisis

Elaph published an essay on Tuesday December 5 by Jamal Khashaqji which is unusual because it tries for a comprehensive analysis of the Iraqi crisis seen from a Sunni perspective, but reasoned and without the name-calling. (A commenter on the Elaph site writes: "May God protect this writer from the the accusations of sectarianism and Baathism and Wahhabism and Safavidism and Farsiism"). It is true that the author was recently (in 2004 anyway) media advisor to the Saudi embassy in London, but I am not even deterrred by that. I think it is worth laying out what he has to say because of the way he arranges the issues, and particularly because of his argument that it is the Sunnis who are in a particularly weak position in Iraq. Anyway the purpose of these posts is not to pick and choose from a position of superior wisdom, something I leave to Informed Comment and others, but rather to get familiar with the range of views so they can speak for themselves.

The writer starts by reviewing the recent exchange between Sadr and Harith al-Dhari. Sadr called on Dhari to publicly and clearly bar Sunnis from killing Shiites, and Dhari replied that he had from day one barred the killing of anyone. Not good enough said Sadr, you have to be clear and unambiguous. The writer continues with an imaginary exchange where Dhari says, well why don't you specifically bar Shiites from killing Sunnis, and never mind hedging with defensive remarks about only going after takfiiris and Baathists, and so on. Be clear and unambiguous. And so on, meanwhile Sunnis kill Shiites and Shiites kill Sunnis, and the country goes to ruin.

If they were to sit together and work out what each side needs, says the writer, the logical outcome would look like this. First of all, the Shiites bear a heavier responsibility, because they are in power, and also because they are the bigger group. The point is that they are able to do more than issue calls and statements. They are in a position to investigate and to punish. The Sunnis range of actions, by contrast, is very limited. They are, says the writer, ground between the two millstones of AlQaeda on the one hand, and the Shiite government authorities on the other. The heroics of Dhari and others, and their insistence on US withdrawal and so on, are little more than bluster, and a cover for a weak position. In fact the day is not far off when they (the Sunnis) will have to admit that the occupation is their only protection from both. It would do them well, he says, to reflect carefully about the escalating calls by Moqtada al-Sadr and his allies for the withdrawal of the American forces, particularly since he has become the most powerful figure among the Iraqi Shiites.

The writer explains that time and the deteriorating security picture are on the side of AlQaeda, which has succeeded in its initial moves, feeds on fitna and violence, and expands its reach, and for the same reasons time is on the side of the extremist equivalent on the Shiite side. These will be the only winners if nothing is done.

The logical conclusion, says this writer, is that regional and US pressure to get the elected government moving, and then to support it as it goes about reining in the militias, "both those that are in the open and those that are secret", bringing criminals before the courts, and eventually terminating the militias entirely. The government would also have to "develop support policies" for legitimate Sunni groups and tribal leaders, so that they will be able to take on AlQaeda, ending the "constraint" that they are now under (referring to fear of AlQaeda reprisals should they work with the government), so that they would be able to represent the real interests of the Sunni population. This latter phase (freeing Sunni groups from the constraints of AlQaeda) would be not only a security operation but should involve the spiritual leaders too, making it clear to all that AlQaeda in no way represents their interests, that there is no excuse for "either knowingly or unknowingly" supporting them, and that the only interests AlQaeda serves are those of the proponents of partition.

He concludes: The time has come for decisive action, because otherwise the situation will only deteriorate still further.

A day in the life

Prime Minister Maliki today announced that the next meeting in the official National Reconciliation process has been rescheduled for the middle of this month. This (if it is held) will be a meeting for political groups and parties, and it follows meetings earlier this year involving tribal chiefs and NGOs respectively. This third meeting has been frequently postponed, mainly on account of government measures that were seen as provocative by Sunni groups, including the October 11 vote on federalism-procedures, and the November 5 announcement of the sentencing of Saddam to death by hanging.

But also today, the Maliki government's own Interior Ministry issued a warning to Iraqis not to have anything to do with the so-called Awda Party, which is one of the organizations (lately focused on fighting AlQaeda in Anbar province, according to a recent Al-Jazeera account), built on the remnants of the banned Baath party. The Elaph reporter includes information suggesting that the reason for this was precisely because it looked as if other government officials might have started contacts with them, presumably with a view to their involvement in the reconciliation process. The reporter paraphrases the Interior Ministry announcement as follows: Interior Ministry questioning of arrested persons confirmed indications "of an opening on the part of certain senior government officials with a view to affiliation with the ranks of the so-called al-Awda Party", which the ministry described as (1) banned; (2) having a hidden agenda for spreading fear throughout the population and shaking the stability and security of the country via various despicable acts; (3) opposing progress and construction; and so on.

The Ministry statement warned anyone having anything to do with this organization risks coming under the surveillance of the security forces, and possible legal punishments.

The reporter doesn't directly connect this with the National Reconciliation process, but the timing, the unusual nature of the warning, and the reference to an "opening on the part of senior government officials" certainly suggest it.

Interior Minister Jawad al-Bulani is one of those rumored to be a candidate for replacement in the coming cabinet shuffle, which Maliki today repeated he will be announcing very soon.

The drumbeat of polarization

Abdulaziz al-Hakim gave a speech yesterday at the United States Institute of Peace (an institution funded by the US Congress) and the main point picked up by Reuters and thence by many others, was Hakim's attack on the "terrorist Baathists". It went like this:

We believe that the deterring factors are not up to the level of their [Baathists'] criminal activities. The strikes they are getting from the multinational forces are not hard enough to put an end to their acts, but leave them stand up again to resume their criminal acts. This means that there is something wrong in the policies taken to deal with that danger threatening the lives of the Iraqis.

Then this:

Eliminating the danger of civil war in Iraq could only be achieved through directing decisive strikes against terrorist Bathists terrorists in Iraq. Otherwise we'll continue to witness massacres being commited every now and then against innocent Iraqis.

The Reuters reporter rendered the "terrorist Bathists terrorists in Iraq" phrase as "Baathist terrorists (and other Islamists) in Iraq".

Clearly in a case like this we need to refer to "Informed Comment", where Juan Cole offers this important background:

...Hakim frequently urges a hard line against the "neo-Baathists" and militant Salafi revivalists, i.e., the Sunni Arabs of Iraq.

So you have a choice in the description of the enemy: "Terrorist Bathists terrorists in Iraq", or in Juan's explanatory turn of phrase, "neo-Baathists and militant Salafi revivalists, i.e., the Sunni Arabs of Iraq".

This comes at a time when Sunni Arabs of Iraq, Shiite Arabs of Iraq, and non-Arabs of Iraq are trying to form a coalition within the elected Iraqi parliament to force an end to the American occupation, summarized here and here, among other places. But what you hear in America is just the endless drumbeat of sectarian polarization.

As a matter of fact, according to Al-Hayat this morning, Hakim didn't primarily urge Bush to hit the Sunnis harder. Rather says the Al-Hayat reporter, the Bush-Hakim discussion centered on "how to support the Maliki administration and the best way of dealing with his (Hakim's) rival Moqtada al-Sadr leader of the Mahdi Army, and the formation of a coalition of moderates to confront the extremists." Same polarization scheme, different enemy.

The lead editorial in Al-Quds al-Arabi talks about "three trips with a single result", referring to Arab League head Amr Musa trying to navigate the political jungle of Lebanon; Palestinian Prime Minister Haniya touring the Gulf and Syria; and Hakim in Washington. Polarization, says the editorialist, has gone so far in all of these cases, that pacification seems now to be impossible. A large part of the responsibility for the polarization rests with Washington, but the Al-Quds editorialist says the Arab regimes in the region are even more responsible, for having acquiesced and supported Washington in this.

Azzaman says some Iraqi opponents of an international conference fear ending up in the dock

The Iraqi newspaper Azzaman leads this morning with the news that Iraqi president Talabani, just returned from his visit to Tehran, has joined SCIRI head Hakim in rejecting the idea of an international conference on Iraq. The newspaper immediately adds the following:

Sources said there is clearly anxiety among a large number of Iraqi politicians about the idea of an international conference on Iraq such as called for by UN secretary general Kofi Annan to fend off civil war, which [opposition to the international conference idea] is to prevent carrying out of demands for establishment of supervisory councils and international court proceedings against 76 individuals from the Iraqi political circles, including ministers, vice-ministers and party heads, with respect to whom files have been assembled on their involvement in operations of killing, kidnapping, and purges, in addition to files relating to corruption of a political nature connected to countries and regions. And the sources said party leaders have held meetings with small elected officials in their parties where the discussion was about the fact that officials in the international council are in possession of documents and evidence that is difficult to refute accusing a group of Iraqi politicians, and some thought this [files and evidence] is an American surprise [because the Americans] have kept this under wraps for a long time.

The idea is that an international council such as that proposed by Annan risks also involving this type of international criminal proceeding.

This is followed by a summary of recent Stephen Hadley remarks (you can read those anywhere), and then the Azzaman journalist gets back to the matter at hand. He reports on remarks by Saleh al-Mutlak from Amman (topic of this post yesterday), quoting Mutlak as follows. "The front (meaning the proposed nationalist coalition involving himelf, Sadr, and others) will exclude SCIRI which is headed by Hakim, and it will exclude parts of the Dawa party, to which Prime Minister Maliki belongs, and also [in will exclude] the two Kurdish parties." The journalist says sources in the Sadr movement confirmed they are part of this same proposed front, whose official announcement is expected in a few days. Mutlak didn't get into the question of participation in this by individuals or groups in the Iraqi Alliance. He confirmed his support for the Sadr movement as a nationalist movement. He said the proposed front will exclude all those who want Iraq divided into sects, and it will welcome all those who are for the unity of Iraq.

Azzman is nationalist in its editorial orientation. So naturally if it feels an international conference would promote the national interest it would support that idea. And if it thought those opposing the idea of an international conference include individuals fearful of ending up in the dock, naturally it would highlight that point. That goes without saying.

What is less understandable is that the place where America goes to catch up on Iraqi news each day, "Informed Comment" by Juan Cole, reports the parts of this Azzaman piece that come right before and right after the above-quoted section on the international conference idea, while leaving out any reference to the criminal-proceedings/international-conference connection. His summary goes like this:

[Azzaman reports] that Mutlak has formed a new coalition in parliament that will include the Shiite Sadr movement. It will stand for the unity of Iraq and a withdrawal of US troops. It excludes the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Da`wa Party, the two mainstays of the current government. The bloc will be announced in the coming days. Gunmen had attempted to assassinate Mutlak on Saturday.

Plugged-in Saudi writer: The Baker-Gates program will reflect the Saudi wish-list

Mamoun Fandy, a writer who is close to the Saudi king, and who used to be a senior fellow at James Baker's research institute, has some remarkable things to say in his regular Monday column in Asharq al-Awsat, something Abu Aardvark alerts us to in the thumbnail sketches on the lefthand side of his website.

Fandy says in his amusing way that he got this information from the bright lights in the sky over Doha at the opening of the Asian Games, and for some reason he feels it necssary to remind us how right he has been in some of his prior predictions. Let's skip that part. Here's his prediction:

John Abizaid needs to be replaced as head of the US Central Command (CentCom), headquartered in Qatar and covering the Mideast from Egypt to Afghanistan, and probably he will be replaced at least in a few months time, because his views on strategy no longer reflect the realities in the field. This is embellished in several ways. Maliki is said to have complained about this to Bush; other Arab foreign ministers to Rice in Jordan. Abizaid's recent congressional testimony and a speech at Harvard all reflect the same disconnect between realities and strategy. Fandy tells us all of this without explaining specifically what the problem is, except that the security situation in Iraq is intolerable, and elsewhere in the region, for instance you can sometimes hear the chanting of A-Qaeda groups even within earshot of US bases. In other words, things are generally spinning out of control, and Fandy says Abizaid isn't on top of this.

Moreover, says Fandy, the Baker Report is going to recommend New Strategic Directions, and the new Defence Secretary Gates is going to be on the same page with this, so there will be a need for a CentCom chief who is too. Abizaid will be too Rumsfeldian for the new strategy. Again, all of this without explaining what specifically is involved.

Best man for the job will be David Petraeus, who has been successful in earlier assignments, and who could easily be promoted from three- to four-star general and given the job. What would it mean?

Finally, in the last two paragraphs of this, Fandy tells us one specific thing this change would involve. Here's the way he puts it:

The first thing this change will mean is a change in the operating strategy, in the way CentCom deals with the terrorist groups in the region, and there will be two parts to this, military and political. Perhaps we will be seeing more visits [to CentCom] from countries that border Iraq, and from other important countries in the region, looking for the application of security measures to limit entry of terrorists into Iraq, along with a request for an increase in US forces in the region in keeping with the size of the danger. And perhaps the new general will see the need for controntation, and not for discussions, with Iran!

More US troops; better Iraq-border security and a more confrontational attitude to Iran. Less talk of negotiating with Iran. Given who is writing this we can assume this is what the Saudi regime wants; and given his line about having seen this written in the night sky over Doha, we can also assume that they think they are going to be successful.

There's more:

David Petraeus, or whatever other general takes the place of Abizaid, will have to be a part of the new strategy of the US administration, and will have to be more proactive, and perhaps less diplomatic, in explaining conditions in the field to Washington and to the neighboring states [neighboring Iraq]. We read the leaked Hadley memo that was printed in the New York Times, and that implied changing the head of the Iraqi government. The fact is that stability in Iraq and the region requires change not only in Iraq, but on both sides, that of the government of Iraq and the American administration. Change in Centcom leadership in Qatar is part of the overall change that is required by the new strategic balance.

So: A more aggressive military strategy, particularly vis-a-vis Iran, less talk of discussions with Iran, as part of an overall change that includes among other things toppling the Maliki government. This is the Saudi wish-list, and it is also where the Baker-Gates program is heading. Nice to know where the decisions are being made.

Sunni leader promoting revival of a nationalist coalition with Sadr

Three weeks ago, November 12, there was a report in Asharq al Awsat about what was being called the National Iraqi Gathering or Assembly, apparently sponsored by a branch of the Dawa party, but including Sadrists, people from the Iraqi National Accord, National Dialogue Front and others, the news of that day being that this was joined by one of the Najaf authorities, Ayatollah Yaqubi, spiritual leader of the Fadhila Party. From the summary back on November 12:

[The movement's spokesman] said: The Iraqi experience since the American attack in 2003 has demonstrated the inability of the existing political parties to go beyond their "narrow special interests, and their ideological sacraments" in a way that could save Iraq from the fate that appears to be awaiting it. To make a long story short, he says the elected political parties have ended up abdicating their responsibility to the nation as a whole, and giving in to the temptation sectarian in-fighting.

Of particular interest to American readers should be his analysis of the "the new American strategy" in Iraq, which he describes as focused on extricating America from a situation that is "distressing [to America] both domestically and globally, even if that [extrication] is at the expense of the democratic experiment in Iraq, which has cost us so many victims." The appeal, which is not only to political parties, but to other groups and tribes and so on as well, refers to the risk currently facing Iraq of being "dispersed and [the various parts] snatched up".

Three short weeks later the risk of an American withdrawal at the expense of the Iraqi democracy obviously seems a lot more threatening. It has been widely reported that Moqtada Al-Sadr, in a reaction to the Maliki-Bush meeting, has been at work on a parliamentary alliance that would call for US troop-withdrawal as an act of Parliament. The news today is from Aswat al-Iraq, and it is in the form of a statement by Saleh al-Mutlak. Here is the whole news item:

Head of the National Dialogue Front Saleh al-Mutlak said today there will soon be an announcement about establishment of a National Salvation Front in Iraq to include various political and religious figures. He explained [in Amman] that the announcement comes by way of reviving a political movement that had been stalled (or words to that effect). He said this will include, besides [his own] National Dialogue Front, the Iraqi List led by Iyad Allawi, the coalition for Reconciliation and Freedom led by Mashaan Juburi, and the Sadrist movement led by Moqtada al-Sadr. It will also include groups from outside the political process including [something called] the Constituent Council led by Jawad al-Halasi, tribal elements from south and central Iraq, along with representatives of the Yazidis, and the Turkmen, Kurdish movements that oppose separation, a coalition of Christians, along with the [something called the] Arab Shiite Movement. And Matlak said the movement will be supported by religious figures of social and political weight, including al-Baghdadi, al-Yaqubi, al-Muiid, and al-Sarkhii, along with the Khalasia school.

That's all it says. This appears to be an expanded version of what was referred to three weeks ago as the National Iraqi Gathering or Assembly, representing nationalist groups of both the Sunni and Shiite persuasion, described then as aimed at protecting the country from the ill effects of an American withdrawal designed only to save their own skin. It is possible this project and the Sadr project for a parliamentary-alliance for US withdrawal are on the same page, but on the other hand a lot of people will say: "it is too late for this". Time will tell.

Saudi writer: Will Bush know enough to look for a negotiated solution, or will he just carry on trying to inflame the Arab regimes against Iran ?

Bilal al-Hassan is writes a regular political column for Asharq al-Awsat. (He happens to be Palestinian, apparently the younger brother of one of the longest-serving "historical Fatah" figures and former Arafat associates Hani al-Hassan). His column today (Sunday December 3) on Iraq and the Bush administration is notable for a number of reasons. Here is a summary of his argument:

While the Bush administration seems to be rejecting the idea of talks with Syria and Iran, this would be a mistake, because these are two countries through which fighters and weapons transit to Iraq, and serious discussions with them could result in putting a stop to that, thus contributing greatly to Iraqi internal stability. Moreover, there are indications that both Syria and Iran are being amenable. For instance, Syria refused the invitation to participate in a three-way summit in Tehran, out of deference to the Arab position; and Iran, for its part, has said there is an important role in the Iraq-pacification process for both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Bush administration, al-Hassan says, should pay careful heed to these signs.

More important is the question of defining what the Iraqi problem is, and here al-Hassan cites statements by Maliki, (parliament president) Mashhadani, and Talabani, all indicating that the problem, far from being exclusively a security problem, is first and foremost a political problem, and the security problems derive from that.

Al-Hassan says a number of conclusions and requirements for action derive from that: (1) There has to be a real American troop-withdrawal, according to a well-defined and thought-out schedule. (2) The Iraqi constitution, whose outlines were first drawn up under the Bremer regime, fosters sectarianism and militates against a sense of national identity (apparently referring to the party-list proportional representation voting system), and this needs to be changed. (3) The concept of federal regions is also a problem. (He adds here in the regional context, partition is something that "is rejected by the Arabs and by the Turks, but it is sufficiently clear that it is not rejected by Iran"). Here too the solution is a new constitution, that would better found the notion of national identity.

Putting this another way, al-Hassan says the answer to Iraq's problems doesn't lie in the direction of the recent "Mecca document", which was a call to end sectarian violence in and of itself; nor in the direction of a Kosovo-style international conference of the type suggested by Kofi Annan, rather it requires a new Iraqi constitution. (Here al-Hassan refers to work already being done by something called the Institute for Studies in Arab Unity in Beirut, and he mentions its leader, one Khayr al-Din Hasib).

Finally, al-Hassan says it is worth studying the differences in approach between the Iranian concept and the Saudi concepts of how to proceed. Based on newspaper reports, he said, the Iranian idea is first to insist on American withdrawal based on a fixed timetable. Secondly (and al-Hassan says he sees a contradiction here), the Iranian plan is for formation of a central government, but also for formation of "Iraqi federalism based on the existing central government". The third Iranian point (according to al-Hassan) is a "rejection of going back to traditional politics in the region, at the expense of the existing system, [in other words rejection of] a return to the exclusion of the Shiite majority from power, which would only increase the chances of separation [of Iraq into three parts]".

Al-Hassan summarizes his criticism of the Iranian approach as follows: It would do away with the American occupation, but it would retain all of the internal fragmentation that went with it. So this should be a point of discussion with the Iranians.

The Saudi approach, he says, was laid down in a cabinet decision of November 27 (the first Saudi cabinet meeting following the famous Cheney visit), and it includes the following main points: (1) Emphasis on regional and historical "balance", which means treating the question of Shiite Sunni balance on a regional basis, and not just on an Iraqi basis; and (2) finding ways to convert the American "occupation" to UN "supervision", for which the Security Council would have to take the initiative.

Al-Hassan says on the face of it this is the Iranians siding with the Shiites and Saudi siding with the Sunni, but he says there is a way of mediating that: Via his idea of a new constitution that would foster national identity at the expense of sectarian identity.

The question, al-Hassan says, is Bush. Will he rest content with just having meetings, or will he have the capacity to grasp the political problem in its entirely, a political problem, he adds, which is of his own creation and that of his military leaders. Will he look for solutions, or will he satisfy himself with continuing his inflammatory remarks against Iran, and his attempt to marshall the Arab regimes against that country? Will he keep up with his slogans about not leaving until the task is done, or will he remember that it is permitted for him to act as the leader of a country, and not just as the leader of a military organization?

Al-Hayat: Hakim will talk to Bush about troop-redeployment "to the oil regions of the South and the North"

Abdulaziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), heads to Washington today for two days of talks with the Americans, following a surprise invitation by Bush. Al-Hayat says Hakim will be presenting to the Americans a "package of concepts" that will include the idea of a regional agreement on security matters, to include at least the countries neighboring Iraq, dealing with such things as border-security and intelligence-sharing. Another idea in the package is a Mideast version of an economic union like the European Union. The Al-Hayat reporter says a careful reading of this indicates it partly reflects Iranian thinking (referring to the idea of regional security cooperation without foreign intervention); but it leaves out any reference to the Iranian insistence on combining this with a US withdrawal commitment.

The reporter says he couldn't get official explanations from SCIRI authorities, but he did speak to people familiar with the workings of SCIRI, and based on their remarks, he adds that Hakim's Washington discussions will likely focus on the two questions: (1) Federalism, which he notes Hakim described yesterday as merely "one of the possible forms of administrative organization" for the country, and not something sectarian; and (2) the future of US troops in Iraq. On the latter point, these SCIRI-knowledgeable people said, the discussions will include the question how much time it will take for an initial redeployment of the US troops; and then, in a second stage, "a future and gradual withdrawal to the oil regions in the South and in the North", and then a final [missing noun] based on circumstances.

"And Hakim...will not forget the oil aspect", the journalist adds, noting this is something "that was also taken up during his first visit to Washington right after the fall of Saddam..." The journalist says it is expected Hakim will focus on the "role of the giant American corporations in cooperation with Iraqi oil companies, and with regional companies with respect to this".

Finally, the journalist notes that Hakim yesterday rejected the proposal of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for an international conference on Iraq, as impractical and illegal, insisting that the existing Iraqi government is one of the strongest in the region.

Big resistance group appears to react negatively to the US-Sunni alliance

(Notes on this after reflecting on all the comments:

(1) I should have left out the last sentence, because it opened the door to the worst thing that can happen on an information-site like this one: Mixing up interpretation with picking sides.

(2) MarkfromIreland points out you can read the "Shiite threat" and the "Baathist traitors" parts of the Islamic Army interview (cited below) as relatively "pro forma" in the sense that first of all a lot of families lost members in the Iraq-Iran war, and even more have heard horrible stories of POW treatment, so that playing on those resentments would be little more than common-sense politically. And secondly, given that the Islamic Army is Islamic and the Baath are not, it could be seen as standard-issue rhetoric to call them traitors. So this kind of thing wouldn't call in question their nationalist core. I hadn't thought of it that way. As Helena reminds us, also in the comments, we need to put our heads together.

(3) What I'm trying to do in this post is to put these two reported events in the context of what the US is probably up to, and in the context of what know about the parties. Which isn't much and needs to be a lot more, is my other point).

Here's the original post:

Aswat al-Iraq, an independent (really) news agency says its person in Hit (Al-Anbar province) reported that armed persons were distributing leaflets to residents informing them that from now on the Islamic Army in Iraq will be part of the Islamic Emirate that was founded last month. In particular, the leaflets said from now on the operations of the Islamic Army in Iraq that are directed against the American occupation will be carried out under the name of the State of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq.

This comes on the heels of an announcement yesterday by the Islamic Army in Iraq, via a taped message broadcast on the internet (which I have not seen), which according to a brief AFP account published by Al-Quds al-Arabi today, urged Sunnis to engage in a fateful or final struggle for Baghdad with the Shiite militias and the "aliens who are gaining strength in Baghdad and are driving you out..."

These announcements raise two questions for those of us still struggling to emerge from our cloud of ignorance about Iraqi resistance movements. (1) What has been the traditional view of the IAI with respect to the Shiites, and does this represent a big shift for them; and (2) given that the Islamic Emirate is fighting a tribal confederation dressed in the uniforms of Saddam's Special Forces and supported by the Americans, what is the IAI's view of the Baathists/American connection, and how big of a shift would it be for them to join the Islamic Emirate.

For background I went to the Islamic Army in Iraq website, where the there is a lengthy transcript of an interview with the Emir of the Islamic Army in Iraq published in an August edition of the IAI's magazine Al-Fursan, explaining the group's fundamental views in a lot of areas.

On the first point:

It appears that the IAI is no stranger to the idea of a "menace from the East". For instance, in explaining the meaning of the IAI's insignia, the official explains that there is an "eye open to the East" which signifies just this awareness and alertness to the "Safavid" threat. Given the fact that available descriptions of the IAI stress (correctly) the purely domestic-Iraqi nature of this group, it has been easy to assume that they don't share the takfiiris' qualms about the "Safavid threat", but it appears to some degree they do. So a declaration of civil war against Shiites in Baghdad doesn't represent any 180-degree shift in attitudes.

On the second point:

The Islamic Army Emir says:

...in the Islamic Army there is not a single Baathist. In fact our aims and our program and our projects are completely different from theirs. And each of them bears the responsibility for what he did and for whatever he gained from it. A faction of them are now [remember this is August 06] at work trying to strengthen their relations with the occupiers, so as to obtain whatever crumbs the Americans might throw their way, while at the same time they insist they are standing up to the occupation, and occasionally they even boast that they lead the resistance... And many of them fled [after the fall of Saddam], and some of them act as spies for the occupation and as enemies of the resistance, and it isn't a secret to anyone that their project is that of agents [for the occupation] and completely opposed to the Islamic project.

Which is his way of saying the Islamic Army doesn't have a high opinion of the Baathists, and in fact doesn't differentiate functionally between them and the occupation itself. So when the Al-Anbar tribal group led by Abu Risha, with American support, formed an alliance with Baathists to fight the Islamic Emirate people, there was never any question which side was the enemy as far as the IAI was concerned. For them, the Americans and the Baathists were badgers from the same hole anyway. (I naturally find that expression hurtful, but there it is, it just came out).

The two announcements (assuming their authenticity) would thus be consistent, not with some huge upheaval in the views of the Islamic Army in Iraq, but rather they would appear to be a logical reaction to news of a US-Sunni alliance. If the US is going to be backing the tribal/baathist confederation in Al-Anbar, then it might seem necessary for the anti-occupation groups to join forces too. And if the post-Amman situation is going to degenerate further into civil war, then there would be--how to say this--"logic" in the idea of mobilizing against the Shiite militias.

(There is another useful point in the above-quoted remarks of the Islamic Army official, and that is his view of the moral character of the ex-Baathist individuals whom he describes as scrambling for any crumbs the Americans might offer them; these will perhaps be the Chalabis and the Alawis of the new Sunni Iraq, at least in the dreams of the Americans).

What did Bush tell Maliki? Take your pick

Let's try an experiment bringing together the Washington and the Arab press coverage (with some shorthand to help keep things straight) to see what probably went down in Amman.

Reports in Azzaman and Al-Hayat on Wednesday referred to what you could call a Sunni wish-list that Bush reportedly planned to present to Maliki together with his "final deadline" threat. For instance, both papers referred to a demand, not only for attacking the mostly Shiite militias, but also for hiring of many former Saddam-regime officers in law-enforcement, in addition to ending the De-Baathification program and a full amnesty. This is the "Sunni wish-list, or else" hypothesis.

Today Al-Hayat merely says Bush gave Maliki a final deadline, but goes no farther than to say this included a requirement for combating the militia, in exchange for which Bush will give Maliki more military authority to do so. There isn't any reference to any of the pro-Sunni points that were reported on Wednesday. This is the "try harder, or else" hypothesis, more or less a neutral position.

Today in the Washington Post, there is an article that describes a debate between two positions on this question in Washington. First, there is the so-called Sunni-outreach, promoted by US ambassador Khalilzad, who is said to have drawn up a long list of measures that would serve to encourage Sunni groups to join the political process. This list, to all appearances, includes a lot of the measures in the Arab-press "Sunni wish-list or else" position: Amnesty, oil-revenue sharing, and so on. So we might rename the "Sunni wish-list, or else" position the "Khalilzad list, or else" position.

Against this, the WaPo piece says, has been a State Dept initiative promoted by Philip Zelikow that said the US should desist from the "Sunni outreach" approach because it risks backfiring, alienating the Shiite majority, without appealing greatly to the Sunnis. We could call this the "Zelikow position".

This gives us three positions: "Khalilzad, or else"; "Zelikow"; and a neutral or say-nothing position that just says "try harder, or else". The "Zelikow" position is sometimes referred to by the plugged-in-Washington people as a "tilt to the Shiites". (See an article by Laura Rozen from November 16). That would give us a "Sunni-Khalilzad", "Shiite-Zelikow", and a "neutral" policy line-up. Okay so far?

Now: back in the real world, we know that Zelikow announced his resignation on Monday November 27, just ahead of the Wednesday Amman Bush-Maliki meeting. And we know that one clear result of the Amman meetings was to outline a very clear US-Sunni alliance as far as the region as a whole is concerned: see the Al-Hayat and Al-Quds al-Arabi coverage today noted in the prior post here. But in spite of the implications of the Zelikow resignation, and of the regional US-Sunni alliance, and in blissful ignorance of the Wednesday Arab-language coverage from Baghdad and Amman, the plugged-in-Washington crowd, represented in this instance by Robin Wright of WaPo, says the Washington debate is now whether or not to endorse the Zelikow position and tilt to the Shiites.

What can we make of it?

Two views of the exclude-Iran movement: Same facts, opposite meaning

Today is Friday, so for the immediate aftermath of the Amman meetings, we don't have local Iraqi newspapers, only the UK-based pan-Arab papers.

Both Al-Quds al-Arabi (anti-Saudi among other things) and Al-Hayat (sometimes pro-Saudi) lead with the idea that everyone at the Amman get-togethers rejected the idea of any concessions to get Iran or Syria involved in promoting stability in Iraq. It is a good illustration of the same-facts, opposite-meaning phenomenon.

According to Al-Hayat:

Bush ...renewed his administration's adherence to its strategic choices in the region, and he brushed off domestic and foreign pressure [for change]. There was clear support for the American and Arab approach of refusing any concessions to Iran or Syria in exchange for their participation in the pacifying of Iraq...[And later in this piece]: High-level Jordanian sources told Al-Hayat that countries in the region warned Washington of the danger of offering any rewards "nuclear-related" in the case of Iran, or "Lebanon-related" in the case of Syria in exchange for their facilitating an honorable American exit from Iraq.

And in an accompanying piece, Al-Hayat puts the matter this way:

[Some suggested there might be a multilateral conference instead of direct discussions, as a way of involving Iran and Syria.] However, in the discussions at Amman, it was a clear given that there was a balanced support in the regional and international environment for dealing with the Iraq issue without any important American concessions to Iran or Syria, particularly with respect to the nuclear or the Lebanon issues, in the words of those close to the environment of the dicsussions.

That is a mouthful, but the really what the journalist is saying is that the people he talked to described shutting out Iran and Syria as enjoying "balanced support" in the region and around the world.

Here's the way Al-Quds al-Arabi describes the same phenomenon.

There was a coalescing of the outlines of political and sectarian alliances in the region, with new leaks indicating that Sunni Arab states oppose the participation of Iran in any settlement of the Iraq question, fearing that this would diminish their [the Sunni Arab states'] influence in the region.

In a nutshell: Where Al-Hayat sees "balanced support", not only in the region but all over the world for shutting Iran and Syria out of the Iraq discussions, Al-Quds al-Arabi sees the formation of a Sunni-regime alliance against Iran, based on "balance" all right, but a "balance" that says: We Sunni Arab, you non-Sunni non-Arab, keep out. One sees "balance", the other sees sectarian polarization.

The "balance" that Al-Hayat sees is the balance between the Bush administration and its allies. For Al-Quds al-Arabi, the polarization whose "lineaments started to coalesce" at Amman is that of a US-supported sectarian jihad against the country that is racially and religiously different.

The "new leaks" that Al-Quds al-Arabi refers to are those reported in the Financial Times of Thursday November 30. And the Al-Quds journalist cites with approval the FT analysis to the effect this is basically part of a regional power-struggle between the Sunni-Arab regimes and Iran.