Hamas--Iraq: A new factor in the Iraqi resistance ?

Apparent efforts by some parts of the domestic Iraqi resistance to negotiate with the Americans, coupled with the efforts by the Qaeda-related Islamic State of Iraq to monopolize the resistance (among other reasons to block any such negotiations), have led to a number of interesting developments, one lasting one being the formation, or re-formation, of something called "Hamas--Iraq," following the split-up of the Brigades of the 1920 Revolution.

There is a lot of background available here on the birth of Hamas--Iraq and its ideology, the most important point being that according to its manifesto, this looks like a group that could be inclined to follow the kind of combined military-political strategy for which the original Palestinian Hamas is known. In theory this might give the Americans a counterparty to negotiate with. Marc Lynch (see the link above) emphasizes that their willingness to negotiate depends on a convincing withdrawal-commitment from the Americans. But there are other issues too.

The Jordanian journalist Mohamed Abu Roman devoted a couple of recent articles to the meaning of Hamas Iraq, and his main point has been to locate the group within the Muslim Brotherhood trend, as opposed to the Salafist trend that has so far dominated the Iraqi resistance. The Muslim Brotherhood, originally Egyptian, now has sub-organizations in a large number of Muslim countries, the most famous being the Egyptian parent organization, and Hamas in Palestine. There are often dramatic differences in the views of these groups between countries, depending on the local political situation, and in fact that is one of the main features of the Ikhwan culture, namely the willingness to work within existing political systems, making alliances and so on, as opposed to Salafi fundamentalism.

Naturally, the formation of an Ikhwan-leaning group within the Iraqi resistance was anathema to the jihadis of the AlQaeda persuasion, and Abu Roman describes their reaction this way:

Within hours of the announcement of the formation of Hamas--Iraq, the public-relations fighting started, with the discussion boards where AlQaeda members are active started a broad campaign against Hamas--Iraq, linking its formation to a Saudi role and a role of other Arab [states], going so far as to call the new group "the Saudi Hizbullah", and they accused the Islamic Party and its leader, Tareq al-Hashimi, vice-president of Iraq, of being behind this. And they said this was tantamount to preparations for a withdrawal of the occupation from the Sunni areas, and handing them over to a force acceptable to the Arab [states] and to the Americans, on condition [this force] would confront the AlQaeda organization.

On the other side of things, the Association of Muslim Scholars welcomed this [via statements by among others] Mohamed Ayesh, considering this an important step as long as the group represents the Muslim masses, adding there was an urgent need for this... There was also clear interest in the birth of a new Hamas movement on the part of Muslim Brotherhood organizations in a number of other countries, and the name was connected with the [Palestinian Hamas] political and ideological program.

And while we can't exclude the idea of an Arab[-regime] "hand" or at the very least an "eye" being involved in the formation of Hamas Iraq, as the AlQaeda people charge, still, the more important point is that this group is closer to the Ikhwani ideas than to the Salafis, and that it represents the beginning of a clear and public military-political role for the Ikhwan on the Iraqi scene, where the resistance has been dominated by a salafi coloration...

So there you have round one: Emergence of an Ikhwan-type "pragmatic" resistance group, immediately denounced by AlQaeda types as a Saudi front, or an instrument by which the Americans would be able to continue their control of Sunni Iraq with Saudi or other Arab-regime help. Abu Roman concedes there could be some degree of involvement by the Arab regimes in the formation of Hamas--Iraq, but he says the more important point is this establishment of an Ikhwan-type organization in the first place, in clear contrast to the salafi fundamentalist approach that he says has characterized the resistance up to now.

But another one of Abu Roman's points was that the Association of Muslim Scholars (the group headed by Harith al-Dhari) welcomed the formation of Hamas--Iraq, another indication, he thinks, of the possibilities for the Iraq-ization of the Ikhwan approach. But immediately there was a protest by an AMS spokesman, who said (1) one of the AMS people Roman cited (Mohamed Ayesh) had left the group to join what is apparently a rival association of Iraqi clerics, and (2) in any event the AMS doesn't have any affinity for the Ikhwan. Abu Roman conceded the first point, but disputed the second, on the basis a lot of the AMS people have Ikhwan backgrounds. We are getting into deep water here, but the point is that the AMS, for its part, immediately distanced itself from the Hamas-Iraq formation, with its Ikhwan-leaning implications.

And there was a second disavowal too. Mohamed Mursi, described as a member of the MB Executive Bureau, issued a statement on the MB website, in which he "denied any links" between the MB and Hamas--Iraq or any other militant organizations in Iraq, adding only that resistance to foreign occupation is legitimate anywhere. Apparently not a very warm welcome from the theoretical allies.

But given the fragmentary and uncertain nature of outside knowledge of the resistance, probably what is important in all of this is that a well-connected observer like Abu Roman sees in the formation of Hamas--Iraq an important new element in the Iraqi resistance, presumably of an Ikhwan-type "pragmatic" inclination, for whatever that might mean, and whatever the support of lack of support they may garner from their theoretical allies in the Muslim Brotherhood.

(There are other issues too: Abu Roman says the original 1920 Brigades, of which Hamas--Iraq is a part, were only third or maybe fourth in importance among the resistance groups (first is Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and second is the Islamic Army, he says), so it isn't immediately apparent what the relative heft of Hamas--Iraq will be in the overall picture in any event. And secondly, the whole idea of "negotiation" depends on the willingness or otherwise of the Americans to commit to a meaningful withdrawal. Unless of course the chat-board jihadis are correct and this is merely a scheme to put an Arab face on the occupation.)