Unified explanation of the American scheme for Palestine, c February 2007

Sometime after the February 2007 Mecca agreement, which set up the framework for a Hamas-Fatah government of national unity, there was drawn up an Action Plan aimed at rolling back the idea of a Palestinian national-unity government, sidelining Hamas, and "building up Abbas' political stock" in a short period of time not to exceed nine months, with the idea that Abbas would call new parliamentary elections in fall 2007, which Fatah would win. The document refers to the February Mecca agreement, and looks forward to the March Rice-Abbas-Olmert summit, so it was written during that interval, making this in effect a last-gasp attempt to keep alive the divide-and-conquer scheme for Palestine promoted by Elliot Abrams at the National Security Council.

The promotion of Fatah and sidelining of Hamas was to involve not only financing and training of security forces connected with the office of the Presidency and loyal to Abbas; but also economic projects to be designed together with the World Bank and the European Union that would have short-term popular effects attributable to Abbas; and creation of an atmosphere of optimism with the initial announcement of negotiations with Israel, to be followed by subsequent negotiations in secret. To kick the thing off, the Action plan called for a positive response from Israel at the March 24-5 summit with Rice and Abbas, to be followed by a positive statement at the Riyadh summit, and formation of an Arab-states council to draw up a final version of the Plan, which council Israel would be able to join. Various elements of this scheme have been highlighted from to time, including the theme of using Palestinian negotiations to insert Israel into the group of Arab US allies, shattering the Hamas-Fatah unity government, and most notably US financial support for training of Palestinian forces loyal to Abbas, detailed in the Conflicts Forum article in January called "Elliot Abrams Uncivil War". What this document does first and foremost is to give us a unified explanation of how all of these parts were supposed to fit together.

The full text of this Action Plan document was sent out for printing by a Jordanian weekly publication called Al-Majd, only to have its printing banned by the Jordanian government. The text, however, remained available on their website. Al-Majd said the high-level source who provided this said it was drawn up by "Arab and American parties", and "presented to Palestinian president Abbas by the head of an Arab intelligence agency". The following is a summary of the first part of the document, with brief translations of certain parts, in order to offer an initial overall view of the document and the plan. It is filled with expressions that translate only too smoothly into English ("Action Plan"; "strong and effective steps"; "decline in credibility", "moving forward with political negotiations" and on and on) indicating to me at least that this is a document whose mother tongue is English. Persons more familiar than I am with State Dept jargon might recognize the style.

The unifying theme in this is the following: Everything that was to be done was for the ultimate purpose of enabling Abbas to call, and then to win, new parliamentary elections in fall 2007, so as to definitively and legally sideline Hamas. The document spells out the idea that World Bank financing was to be considered from that perspective; wage-payments were to be arranged with that in mind; even the idea of negotiating with Israel was to set up an atmosphere of optimism that would similarly help Abbas; strengthening of law and order were also for the purpose of enhancing the position of Abbas. What this document shows is that not only was the US still intent, after the Mecca agreement, on dislodging the elected government of Hamas, but that all of the component parts of the scheme, political, financial and economic, were all subordinated to that.

Here's how the document begins:

Action plan for the Presidency of Palestine, year 2007

I. The task

The president of Palestine Mahmoud Abbas has suffered a decline in credibility outside of Palestine following the signing of the Mecca agreement, and the failure of the government of national unity to respond to the requirements of the Quartet, or Abbas' basic conditions. In the absense of strong efforts by Abbas to protect the position of the presidency as the center of gravity of the Palestinian leadership, it can be expected that international support for him will diminish and there won't be enthusiastic coooperation with him (in light of the fact his effectiveness has been in continual decline). And a growing number of countries, including the European Union and the G-8, will start to look for Palestinian partners that are more acceptable and more credible, and more able to make advances in security and governance. And this would strengthen the position of Hamas within Palestinian society, and would further weaken Fatah and the Palestinian presidency. And it would also diminish the chances for early elections.

For this reason Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas needs to take strong and effective steps based on the Action Plan to make himself more acceptable and more credible, ahead of the talks with the Israelis and the Americans on the occasion of the visit of US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, expected in March 2007. Moreover, this Plan will remain the center of attention of the international community and the United States, to provide the necessary support for moving ahead with the political operations in their appropriate channels.

It is necessary to see the parts of this Plan as necessary components in the operation of building a Palestinian state (governance, sound economic measures, institution-building, establishment of the rule of law).

II. Objectives

This section starts by repeating the idea of putting Abbas back as the center of gravity in the eyes of foreign governments. In addition, there is a need to define what each of the parties has to do to implement this Plan, and the document adds: "And this means avoiding the wasting of valuable time trying to alter the ideology of Hamas, or turning back the clock to pre-Madrid times. Wasting valuable time in a political effort to get Hamas to join the parade will only weaken the basis for a peaceful agreement".

Then there is this: Abbas should be given the financial and political support necessary to "enable him to move forward with the political negotiations for the establishment of a Palestinian state, and to build up his political capital, so as to enable him to move to part B of the Plan (early Palestinian parliamentary elections).

And there is the corollary objective: "Delivering a strong political blow to Hamas by supplying the Palestinian people with their immediate economic needs through the Presidency and Fatah", in addition to the strengthening of government institutions within the Palestinian Authority.

The next objective is this: Providing the Presidency with the necessary wherewithal to establish its control over the security apparatus, which "will deter Hamas or any other faction from any attempt at escalation, as long as the security control of the Palestinian Authority and Fatah is on a firm basis".

Finally there is the idea of strict timetables for each of the components of the Plan (from three to nine months depending on the component), so as to focus the efforts of all the parties; and a reminder of the need for affirmation of full support for this Plan from Israel and the United States.

III. Components of the Plan

(1) Political

Getting into negotiations with Israel about the establishment of a Palestinian state, including discussions about final status, along with the necessary steps to change the reality on the ground in the short term--this is going to be a necessary element in building up the political capital of Abbas and of Fatah.

"From another angle", says the document, "the public launching of these negotiations, and then their continuation in secret, will guarantee the necessary optimism in this respect, while at the same time protecting the participants in this from political pressure. Likewise, the setting of a schedule for withdrawals, along with confidence connected with progress in the security plan will also aid the political process (programmed withdrawals, elimination of barriers and checkpoints, rrelease of prisoners, halting construction of new colonies, stopping excavation work in Jerusalem). And it is also important that the Palestinian Authority commit to the following: (and there is a discussion about internal commitments to end violence, recognize prior international agreements and so on).

(2) Governance

It will be necessary to supply Abbas with the means, both material and legal, to govern and to strengthen his credibility and legitimacy, so as to make him comfortably capable of calling parliamentary elections by the beginning of autumn 2007. This includes the need for internal reforms in Fatah, including election of a new Fatah Central Committee with more representation from the New Guard, ensuring a single unified slate in the elections, and getting control over the Al-Aqsa Matryrs Bridade.

(3) Security

Following introductory remarks about the need to control groups that violate the truce, and so on, there is this: "The security component of this Plan is in accordance with the security obligations that were earlier agreed upon between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Dayton -- Dahlan), and the agreements that were arrived at with the "Arab quartet" and the United States. Strict targets and timetables and so on respecting the security commitments will be necessary "to ensure the support of Israel and the other parties".

(4) Economic

This section starts off by saying there is a need for a mechanism for paying wages via the office of the Presidency, as long as Hamas refuses to comply with the requirements of the Quartet, and this is necessary in order to ensure payment "to those who are in agreement with it (apparently meaning in agreement with the Presidency)", and to make sure that the money doesn't fall into the hands of "any faction or organization". This would be another factor building up Abbas' credibility, the report says.

The first sub-head under "Economic" goes like this:

Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas should propose, in consultation with the World Bank and the European Union, a plan that defines specific sectors and projects that are in need of financing, and that will show useful and tangible results on the ground in the space of six to nine months, centering on the alleviation of poverty and unemployment. And since some projects will take more than nine months, there should be a guarantee of adequate results within the nine months. This is so as to guarantee the usefulness of these projects before the elections.

There is a section with brief mention of measures for easing the flow of goods.

IV. Implementation of the Plan

The Plan should be presented to the Palestinians as something for them to support and to obtain the agreement of the United States and the Arab quartet, as a first step. And this would give Israel and the Europeans assurance that Abbas has a concrete plan. Followed by this:

The United States and/or Jordan and Egypt and Saudi Arabia could form a joint council (with representation of all parties) that could draw up the plan in final form, and it would be possible for Israel to participate in this.

What Israel needs to do: Israel should undertake parallel commitments, in connection with the presentation and agreement to this Plan at the coming summit, as indicated in the proposed draft joint communique for Rice, Abbas and Olmert, at the end of their March summit, and this in turn will motivate the Arab summit in Riyadh to issue a positive statement in support of the political efforts, and to reaffirm the Arab peace proposal. Just as the Palestinians can be expected to take a step forward, so too the Israelis need to demonstrate their commitment and seriousness in moving forward. And this is a necessity for them, if they hope to see the Arab inclusion that they have been hoping for for so long.

Another "Action Plan": It worked so well in Gaza

The American/ArabModerates plan for the elimination of Hamas, as it was formulated in the so-called "Action Plan" dating from February or March of last year, included not only plans for training and supply for the Fatah security forces, but also plans for World Bank financing for quick-results "development" in Fatah-controlled territory. (Here's my summary, and here's a summary by Conflicts Forum). It was explicitly a carrot-and-stick demonstration project, and the section on "Economy" began as follows:

Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas should propose, in consultation with the World Bank and the European Union, a plan that defines specific sectors and projects that are in need of financing, and that will show useful and tangible results on the ground in the space of six to nine months, centering on the alleviation of poverty and unemployment. And since some projects will take more than nine months, there should be a guarantee of adequate results within the nine months. This is so as to guarantee the usefulness of these projects before the elections.

(At that point Fatah and Hamas had not yet had their showdown in Gaza. In fact this US support for Fatah was undoubtedly one of the factors that led to that showdown.* The "six to nine months" time-horizon was based on the expected next round of parliamentary elections in both the West Bank and Gaza).

A similar plan is taking shape in Iraq, where yesterday there was convened a conference of GreenZone officials (including Maliki and the minister for planning and economic cooperation, one Ali Baban)with provincial governors and heads of provincial councils. Unfortunately the source for this, the regime-newspaper AlSabaah, doesn't tell us what provinces were represented. But via excerpts from remarks by Maliki and Baban, we can get an idea of the general plan. Maliki:

"The central government will work to attract international expertise to the provinces to assist them in their development-planning for this year....We will support local governments in all the provinces in their planning and development. Not least because this is the right opportunity for local governments to open up to investment, following improvements in the security situation." [Maliki was] inviting the local governments to overcome their problems at the earliest possible time, in order to get additional allocations from the supplementary budget on which he said work will start the middle of this year. And he also urged local governments in the provinces to start work on other studies and plans for projects other than those they expect to institute this year.

Maliki called this a pioneering conference and an initial step in the direction of overcoming past problems via economic development. The headline point: This year's budget includes an amount for provincial development projects that is 90% bigger than the comparable amount in 2006.

The pattern is the same. At a time when the nation is split (Fatah versus Hamas in the Palestinian case; Supreme Council/Kurdish versus Sadrist and Sunnis in the current case), the proposal is to promote "economic development" under the control of the side currently in the West's favor, in the face of continuing confrontation with the other side. Maliki's references to "international expertise" and "opening to investment" are meaningful enough as an indication of the proposed role of the free-market community.

As if to drive this point home, these remarks are twinned with press conference remarks by Adel Abdul Mahdi (the Supreme Council's IMF/World Bank groupie) in which he denied that there was any politics involved in the veto of the provincial-powers law. He said it was purely a question of constitutionality, and he mentioned in particular the point about central government powers to fire elected provincial governors and heads of provincial councils. Spokesmen for both the Sadrists and the Accord Front (Sunni) have charged that this was done by Mahdi on behalf of the Supreme Council in order to obstruct the process leading to new provincial elections.

______

*This is an understatement. Vanity Fair published a lengthy article today on its website telling much more of the story behind the Bush administration's promotion of civil war between Fatah and Hamas, and it puts the above-mentioned "Action Plan" in the context of that overall story (The "Action Plan" of early 2007 appears in the section headed "Plan B" on pages 5 and 6 of the web version of the story). The story is very aptly called "Gaza Bombshell" because it nails these events in great detail to the Bush administration. The only point that is overlooked is the "plan" included an economic development component (not that it went anywhere, but it was part of the plan).

Economics for the 21st century

From today's Al-Quds al-Arabi:

[We] learned from sources working for NGOs in Palestine yesterday that they have received from the USAID organization a request for them to present large-scale project proposals for financing [by USAID] in the West Bank on an accelerated basis. According to these sources, USAID ...requested, less than 12 hours after the appointment of Dr Salam Fayadh to form an emergency government, ideas for huge projects to be carried out in the West Bank, on condition that these projects be capable of showing quick results in the life of people in the West Bank and that they involve large numbers of Palestinian workers. The sources told [us] that these are [supposed to be] projects in which it will be apparent that there is large-scale American funding for improvements in the life of the people of the West Bank, and that this [American connection to the quick improvements] should be readily apparent to the eye and tangible on the ground....

And lest there be any doubt, these NGO sources spelled out the political content of this:

The sources said what is being asked of them is to convince the people of the West Bank that they are fortunate having the government of Fayadh and the decision of Abbas to form this government, in contrast to Hamas which controls Gaza. Concerning the possibility of carrying out any projects in the Gaza Strip, sources who asked not to be identified by name said they are being told it is not allowed to let even one dollar reach the Gaza Strip.

The sources said the USAID office in Tel Aviv will be busy with formulating details for this today and in the days to come. The reason these need to be projects with short-term tangible effects to influence the results of the elections Abbas and his handlers hope to call soon.

Hijacking of economic aid to serve the anti-Hamas agenda isn't new. In the document headed "Action Plan" (of US authorship, written sometime in February of this year) published in the Jordanian paper Al-Majd last month, there is an elaborate set of plans for enhancing the strength and reputation of the Abbas group at the expense of the elected Hamas government, and the scheme was exactly the same then as it is now: Using a variety of means to bolster Fatah and weaken Hamas, ahead of hoped-for new elections in fall 2007. In particular, the Action Plan document included this:

Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas should propose, in consultation with the World Bank and the European Union, a plan that defines specific sectors and projects that are in need of financing, and that will show useful and tangible results on the ground in the space of six to nine months, centering on the alleviation of poverty and unemployment. And since some projects will take more than nine months, there should be a guarantee of adequate results within the nine months. This is so as to guarantee the usefulness of these projects before the elections.

So the plan isn't new at all, in fact the new geographic/political separation of Gaza from the West Bank makes it easier to implement. Or you could put it another way. The reason these "huge projects" are only being launched now, and not at the time of the February Action Plan could well be this: At the earlier time, it was possibly seen as too difficult to wall off Fatah/Abbas bailiwick from that of Hamas. And on that line of thinking, the Gaza-WestBank split could be seen as representing a positive factor (planned or unplanned) in the overall American/Israeli scheme.

It is worth noting that apart from the efforts of Conflicts Forum and War in Context (with an honorable mention from Tony Karon), the Action Plan document, important as it is, was boycotted not only by the corporate media but by the "progressive" blogosphere as well.

The point being that the Gaza events are generally seen another catastrophic defeat for the Bush administration (followed by remedial plans such as these seat-of-the-pants economic projects), while in point of fact the events in Gaza could just as well be seen as something (planned or unplanned) facilitating the implementation of a pre-existing plan.

Next up: Plan for a NATO force to take over where Dahlan failed

The proposal for deployment of an international force in the Gaza Strip, mentioned by Abbas in talks with Sarkozy on Friday, reflects an attempt by the American administration to revive a plan that was first proposed during the Arafat captivity in 2001, for an international "peacekeeping" force to put down the Palestinian resistance. Al-Akhbar reports: "The proposal by Abbas for deployment of an international force in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is a revival of an American plan for a 'mandate'", spelled out in a 68-page report by the Army School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in the year 2001, whose implementation is said to have been blocked for various reasons in earlier years, but which is now again a topic of American interest.

Sources said Condoleeza Rice encouraged Abbas to continue promoting the plan for deployment of international forces to permit control of the situation in the Gaza Strip, following [the Hamas takeover]... In fact, at a time when the plan doesn't enjoy Palestinian acceptance, even from the so-called Group of 15 that advise Abbas, the American administration is insisting that this plan doesn't imply the beginning of direct deployment of American troops, but rather the deployment in an international force which NATO would help form. [The Americans also say] this will be one of the tasks that the new Quartet representative Tony Blair will be focusing on, and [that American General Keith Dayton] is undertaking to add details to the plan.

The Al-Akhbar reporter outlines the main points of the original SAMS report (20,000 troops, well-armed with weapons and with the argle-bargle of protecting Israeli national security and Palestinian national development and so on), summarizing as follows:

The sources said the American concept for deployment of an international force in Gaza and the West Bank was set down in its basic form earlier as a peace-keeping force with a security mission of ending the armed resistance against Israel. The Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip led to suspension of the idea, but it is now being looked at again following the Hamas takeover of Gaza and the sudden collapse of the PA security apparatus there.

(The Jordanian newspaper AlDustour has a very similar report, according to a Palestinian news agency, but I haven't seen it. Needless to say the bloggers and others with Washington connections are maintaining strategic silence, as they have done with the Al-Majd "Action Plan", the Dahlan-intelligence story, and so much else).

A planned result ?

Mohammed Dahlan, seemingly politically unfazed by the recent events, said in a Reuters interview that Hamas "fell into a trap" laid by Israel when it took control of the Gaza Strip. There isn't any elaboration on how the trap was set, and certainly there isn't any indication of Dahlan's role or that of anyone else in particular.

Charles Levinson, at ConflictBlotter.com, who talked to a number of Fatah fighters in Gaza following their defeat, summed up his findings this way:

Fatah never fought. Gaza was essentially handed over to Hamas. Soldier after soldier said they felt betrayed and abandoned by their leadership. There was a seemingly willful lack of decision making by the senior most political leadership. Up and down the Gaza Strip from the first moments of fighting, the military leadership disintegrated while the political leadership remained eerily silent.

Levinson goes out of his way to point out there are any number of good reasons for the defeat from a military point of view, but certainly the Dahlan remark about the "trap" does correspond quite nicely with Levinson's observation that during the crutial time "the [Fatah] political leadership remained eerily silent."

If the Hamas victory was one "surprise", the second "surprise" wasn't long in coming, in the form of Abbas' immediate "firing" of Prime Minister Haniya, estblishment of an "emergency" government, and denunciation of Hamas as terrorist killers with the aim of setting up a takfiiri emirate. This is much more the language of Washington than that of Ramallah. Two back-to-back "surprises"...

Then there is the point about US policy. The US-authored "Action Plan" of February talked about the need to re-affirm Abbas and Fatah as the "center of gravity of the Palestinian leadership", via security, economic, and political means, so as to make sure that his international support didn't continue to decline as a result of the Mecca-accord on a unitary government with Hamas. None of the specific "action" points in the Action Plan came to fruition--not optimism respecting talks with Israel; not quick-fix economic development; not even Fatah control of security. So faced with that, it is reasonable to assume that the Washington-Israel-Fatah people had given some thought to an alternative that would promote the same ultimate end: ensuring international support for the Fatah leadership, and also promoting the same ultimate end of isolating Hamas economically, politically and with respect to security.

Logic suggests what happened could well have been the result of a deliberate policy choice. Dahlan in fact says it was that, when he says Hamas fell into an Israeli-laid trap. And the Levinson interviews with surviving Fatah fighters suggest they feel that way too.

And the "intelligence debacle" first reported, in alarmist tones, by the disinformation site DebkaFile? While subsequent remarks by Hamas people suggest there was in fact some intelligence leakage, it is also possible that in the overall picture, we can identify the particular disinformation-purpose served by the Debka scoop: To make the Fatah defeat look like something truly unexpected and not planned beforehand.

Where the carrot and stick policy leads

If you ask what could be the makeup or the cover story that would bring with it American official approval for the current butchery in Gaza, it might help us to recall the so-called Action Plan of around March 2007. In that document, leaked to a Jordanian newspaper, the outlines were set for a two-pronged policy: Degradation and harassment of the Hamas government of the Gaza Strip, and international cooperation for the economic and political flourishing of the West Bank. (Links and so on are available if you search "Action Plan" in the search-box at the upper left of this page).

There was a piece a few days ago--it was in the New York Times so no one paid much attention to it--in which Condi paid her last visit to Jenin in the West Bank, and there was a celebration of the West-Bank rebirth story:

Today, though, Jenin is a showcase of success for the Palestinian Authority, following a law and order campaign this spring by specially trained Palestinian security forces, and an example of how a particularly thorny situation can be turned around.

The current Israeli savagery in Gaza is best seen as part of the other arm of that two-pronged policy, namely the degradation and harassment of Gaza so long as it is controlled by Hamas. It was to be particularly in the area of the security forces that this degradation was to take place, and specifically the funding of a new Abbas-loyal, Fatah-loyal, security agency, under the wise supervision of the American General Keith Dayton, whose work is celebrated in the above-mentioned NYT piece as follows:

About 600 Palestinian security personnel members were deployed in Jenin in May, some of whom were trained in Jordan under an American-sponsored program to back up the forces already there. Most have since been redeployed to other parts of the West Bank, including Hebron.

Lt. Gen. Keith W. Dayton, the United States security coordinator, told reporters that the exercise had been a “great success,” and that the Israelis said they had reduced their incursions into Jenin by about 40 percent.

Obviously, "great success" in the Gaza part of this two-pronged strategy has been harder to come by, hence the Israeli decision, supported by the United States, to resort to what we are now seeing.

Just as the American bombing of Sadr City during the Maliki security campaigns arose out of a divide and conquer strategy for Iraq (the new airport in Najaf was opened at around the same time, amid the same kind of NYT "economic rebirth" celebrations that we saw in relation to Jenin), so the bombing of Gaza in the context of the overall American strategy for Palestine. Our friends are supposed to flourish, and the resistance wither.

The blind arrogance of this was maybe less obvious then than it is now, because as the policy fails again and again, the means become more violent and barbaric. More and more clearly, it is America that is out of control, not the resistance.

It would be well, at the same time, to remember where this destructive potential comes from in terms of the overall strategic picture that the American establishment has been trained and nursed on. For instance, to begin with, the politically-inspired nature of the WB/IMF "economic development" philosophy is part of it.

By the way, what happened to this whole idea of "public diplomacy" that we've been hearing so much about in the last little while?

Washington's role in the West Bank

Congress last week approved $80 million of US funds to train and equip five brigades to be under the control of the Abbas administration in the West Bank, pursuant to the Dayton Plan, under the direction of US general Keith Dayton, Haaretz reported yesterday. I don't recall reading in the American media any report of any debate about that congressional action, or any followup discussion for that matter. Which isn't surprising, because the leaked document that first laid out the Dayton Plan in detail, hasn't been a big topic of discussion anywhere in the English language media either.

However, the Lebanese paper Al-Akhbar does take note of the development, and puts it in the context of the escalating Fatah-Hamas tensions. The journalist writes:

The question of Palestinian control of the West Bank has become a responsibility of Washington, which is making plans for the establishment of five Palestinian battalions for deployment throughout the West Bank, and this comes at a time when Hamas is accusing the caretaker government headed by Salam Fayyad of coordinating with Israel in the closure of over 100 charitable organizations, targeting thereby the social arm of the movement (Hamas).

It's worth recalling that under "Objectives" in the original Dayton Plan outline, the aims included this: "Delivering a strong political blow to Hamas by supplying the Palestinian people with their immediate economic needs through the Presidency and Fatah..." The move to shut Hamas-affiliated social-assistance groups is a corollary of that, and what the Al-Akhbar reporter is doing with is calling attention to what you could call the coherence of the Dayton Plan: Shifting the balance militarily to the faction friendly to America and the Israeli occupation, while at the same time shifting the balance in terms of "supplying the Palestinian people with their immediate economic needs..." and it is clear that the corollary of that is shutting down social-aid groups that are affiliated with Hamas. The closure orders, based on a June decree by Abbas requiring all organizations to apply to him for re-registration, are discussed in detail here. What is important for Americans to understand is that the closure of Hamas-affiliated voluntary organizations is tantamount to an attack on Palestinian civil society, and that this is part and parcel of the plan that also includes military aid for the Abbas-Fayyad "government".

The military part of which, the Israeli paper Haaretz tells us, was approved by Congress last week. Didn't know that, did you?

Rebirth of the anti-Iran Arab front

Nine Arab foreign ministers met in Abu Dhabi on Tuesday, and the host-country foreign minister issued a statement that included this:

We are working to overcome this difficult time in the Arab world and ensure that unwelcomed, non-Arab parties do not get involved in our affairs in an un-constructive manner.

And this:

Our aim is to boost Arab solidarity and mobilize our backing for the Arab Peace Initiative, bolster support for the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of H.E. President Mahmoud Abbas and for the Palestine Liberation Organisation PLO—the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

In a word: These countries, which include Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are embarked on a new or renewed program to close ranks against Iran and Hamas.

Given the fact that this meeting was originally touted as having something to do with reacting to proposals by George Mitchell, you'd think the Western coverage of the event would be very informative, but you'd be wrong--there wasn't any Western coverage. So: Mitchell travels to the region supposedly in search of accomodation among all the parties, and the initial result is an Arab get-together apparently aimed at isolating the resistance and its supporters (Syria itself wasn't invited to the Abu Dhabi meeting).

Qatari paper AlArab had this to say on its front page about the Abu Dhabi meeting, after stressing the part of the communique about "non-Arab" and "unwelcome" "interventions":

Sources that participated in part of the meetings told AlArab that the most important result of the meeting was the assigning to the Emirates of the task of Palestinian reconciliation, since the UAE seems acceptable, given that Hamas and other resistance factions have expressed reservations about the role of Egypt.

And with respect to Iran, the sources said the foreign ministers agreed on a complete action plan--both political and info-media--designed in the first place to toughen their dealings with the Islamic Republic and isolate any moves on its part in the Arab area, including with respect to Palestine. They also decided on a complete media plan to be led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt with their media, especially those in London and Dubai, to launch an attack against Iran and against what is being propagated by AlJazeera, especially with respect to the Iranian role in the region.

The AlArab reporter says authorities in some countries that weren't at the meeting expressed misgivings, and one of them said it appeared the real aim might well be to try and abort the Saudi peace initiative.

Meanwhile, Abdel Bari Atwan in AlQuds alArabi, in an op-ed headed "What are they cooking up in Abu Dhabi" points to the significance of Abu Dhabi as the venue for this new belligerent approach to Iran, being the one country in the region with a territorial dispute with Iran, and he recalls the role of Kuwait in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq.

Countries that weren't invited to the Abu Dhabi meeting included Qatar, Syria, Sudan and Lybia. Countries that were invited but stayed away included Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon and Iraq. Atwan says they probably either recognized the ominous nature of this meeting, or else they are waiting to see which way the wind blows in the wake of the meeting.

It would be interesting to hear something from the Imperial Court in Washington about the relationship of this event, so reminiscent of the glory days of Condoleeza, to the Mitchell visit.

Updating the US plan for Palestine

Azzam al-Ahmad, a senior Fatah person, and currently deputy Prime minister in the government of national unity, has said if the current economic blockade led by the US and Europe isn't lifted, the national unity government will collapse within three months at most, and the author of the lead editorial in Al-Quds al-Arabi (which leans to Hamas, as you know) says he agrees. And the editorialist adds: There isn't any prospect of the blockade being lifted, because the Palestinians' "friends" aren't putting any pressure on Washington to do so. He says Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas raised this with the Saudi king during his recent tour, "But the only response he obtained was advise to to to Washington and get their agreement first of all, then there wouldn't be any problem resuming funding of the Palestinian Authority".

And logic suggests the Americans may well be already planning for the post-collapse situation. Why else, the editorialist asks, would they continue spending millions on training and arming of security forces associated with Fatah, at the same time that they continue to block general funding for the government? He puts it this way:

The American administration, which earmarks millions for the Presidential Guards, and finances training and arming of its members in Jordan and in Egypt, is perhaps preparing in advance for stage that comes after the collapse of the government. It doesn't seem logical that they would earmark $60 million for the reconstruction of the [Presidential] Guards, and at the same time block [general] funding for the government, in spite of the fact that the Minister of Finance is friends with many of the American authorities, including Condoleeza Rice...

The scheme laid out in the February-March "Action Plan" (see prior post) called for building up of the role of Abbas and Fatah within the formal framework of the national unity government, via quick-fix economic funding, euphoria over negotiations with Israel, and security-improvements. Obviously that overall scheme has not worked out. What the Al-Quds editorialist is suggesting is what comes next for US policy: Namely continued economic squeeze, with generous funding only for the Fatah-related security forces in preparation for the period of lawlessness that will follow the national-unity government's inevitable collapse.

What the separation-walls mean

Al-Hayat brings together some comments on the Great Wall of Adhamiya:

A member of parliament for the Islamic Party said resort to this policy reinforces the tendency to sectarianism among the population, in fact this decision relies on [or sanctions] the sectarian factor in isolating the area, pointing out that "this is an index of the fact that this government has not yet grasped that while military effort is needed, it is not he solution of every problem."...

The official spokesman for the Sadrist trend told Al-Hayat "A policy of enclosing neighborhoods is not going to make the Baghdad security plan succeed. Adopting this approach is a result of the fact that the Iraqi military forces have voluntarily submitted to the American occupation". ...

A resident by the name of Ali Ibrahim said "it appears that federalism, with its desire to partition Iraq, will also include Baghdad in its partitioning. People here are talking about a decision by the government to issue special identity [cards or badges] to the residents of Sunni neighborhoods."...

Computer programmer Mustafa, age 25, stressed "uneasiness with the thrust behind the wall [policy] because it will turn Adhamiya into a giant prison."

The journalist balances this with explanations by government people, and a mocking comment by the Islamic State of Iraq. But the gist of the above-noted comments, representing Sunni political opposition, Shiite political opposition and the views of residents, is that this wall isn't just a random bad idea. On the contrary, the idea here is that the wall embodies and symbolizes the fact that "Iraqi forces have submitted to the occupation"; that the Maliki government and the Americans are relying on and sanctioning the principle of sectarian separation; and that the occupation appears to be taking the partition/federalism scheme right into the heart of Baghdad. In a word: The wall embodies and symbolizes the fact that the Americans are not merely responding to violence to try and minimize it. Rather, they are implementing by force a proactive strategy that exploits the sectarian problems in the interests of partition and further weakening of the country; and the Iraqi forces are going along with that.

A lot of the "progressive" American criticism of the war is based on the contrary idea, namely that the Bush administration lacks a coherent plan, that they are buffoons, that they are already way past plan B, and absurdly up to the letter F or G. That they are continually being outwitted by the mercurial action-hero Sadr. And so on and so forth. This is the view that sees the Bush administration as the short guy in the old tall-guy/short-guy vaudeville routine, a sad story, supposedly, that will lead to inevitable defeat and withdrawal. The point here is that a discussion that stays within that framework is missing the other side of the story, namely that there really is a proactive American strategy, and that they are not really there as peacekeepers.

Let's give credit where credit is due. The building of isolation-walls around troublesome residential areas in Iraq was part of a series of war-winning ideas published over four months ago by the neo-con Nibras Kazimi, former Chalabi employee and De-Baathification implementer, now at the Hudson Institute (see his personnel blurb there), in a December 1 2006 post that included this:

I propose a ‘closed canton’ method for Baghdad’s Sunni-heavy suburbs of Hai al-Jami’a, ‘Amiriya, Jihad, Ghazaliya, Yarmouk, Dora, Khadra’ and ‘Adhamiya, closing each off unto itself. A similar fix should be extended to the rural Sunni satellite towns (the housing clusters) to the north, west and south of Baghdad: Mushahdeh, Khan Dhari, Mahmoudiya, Yusufiya, and ‘Arab Jbour.

This should be done using the Israeli method: fence them with concrete and technology. The Israelis have been building a separating wall between them and the Palestinians over the past two years....

Israeli separation walls for Iraq seemed a bizarre figment of the neocon imagination at the time, but now that it appears to be US policy, it's worth taking a look at the politics of this. Kazimi called for high-profile development projects to be undertaken in the walled-off areas, and also this: "...a systematic effort to match the Saddam regime's personnel archives to the current addresses of these ex-officers from the military and intelligence services should be undertaken. Most of these officers were given state-sponsored housing in the above mentioned neighborhoods during the Saddam era..." In other words, if we take Kazimi as an index of the neo-con approach, it would appear a major political aim of this walling-off strategy has to do with more-efficient hunting down of ex-Baathists, contrary to the supposed US strategy, which is to ease de-Baathification and try and negotiate with the domestic (non-AlQaeda/ISI) resistance.

So while we are being told that the US recognizes the damage caused by the initial de-Baathification excesses, and is supposedly pressing the Maliki administration to do more by way of national reconciliation, the Israeli-wall strategy points in the other direction, toward an intensified exploitation of the sectarian issue, hand in hand with an intensification and militarization of de-Baathification.

Why Cheney didn't mention Palestine

Cheney only talked about Iraq and Iran on his recent tour of the Arab capitals, according to Al-Quds al-Arabi's Arab sources with knowledge of the talks, who stressed the parties "absolutely didn't bring up the Arab-Israel conflict". The sources explained this as follows:

[T]here has been an allocation of roles between Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, in which the role of the latter has been limited to the Israel-Palestine file.

I mention it for what it is worth, because the question of sorting out the fingerprints of Cheney-Abrams on the one side from those of Condoleeza Rice on the other has been one of the great mysteries.

For instance, Mark Perry and Paul Woodward of Conflicts Forum have a detailed piece in the Asia Times on the "Action Plan" that was presented to Palestinian president Abbas in February or March, and sets out very broad and detailed American-inspired plans for sidelining and eventually toppling Hamas, clearly an Abrams-type document. The Arabic version was leaked to, and published by, the Jordanian newspaper Al-Majd, first on its website, then, following a censorship incident, also in its hard-copy paper. Western media have bent over backwards to ignore the document, which is really a 16-page indictment of US hypocricy about supporting elected governments. I summarized the contents here. This was followed by another document, leaked to Haaretz, that called specifically, and much more narrowly, for "Benchmarks" for the easing of Israeli checkpoints and so on, clearly more of a Rice-type document, and there is a question of the relationship between the two documents, a relationship which Perry and Woodward think may well reflect the "turmoil in Washington" between the two camps.

In any event, for what it is worth, the above-mentioned sources cited by Al-Quds al-Arabi think there has been some kind of an agreement about spheres of influence between Rice on the one side and Cheney and his group on the other. These are not perhaps the most impeccable sources for Washington policy issues, but I mention it for what it is worth.

Saudi clerics call for group action against the "US-Persian backed" Iraqi Shiites

A group of 38 Saudi bigshots, including preachers, present and former university professors, and government officials, all of them is some way or other considered to be religious authorities of some description, issued a statement Monday on a Saudi website, which depending on how you read it, either calls for pogroms against Iraqi Shiites, or perhaps stops a short step short of that. And the Najaf authorities have replied angrily that Riyadh should take a resolute position against this.

A Reuters reporter did a summary of sorts in Arabic, and there is an AP version, but both of them left out important parts, perhaps understandably. A commenter kindly sent the link to the original statement. Here is one excerpt I originally saw in Elaph:

After almost four years of the occupation of Iraq, it has become apparent that the aim is the seizure of Iraq jointly by the crusaders and Safavid rafida ("rejectionists", referring to Shiites as heretics), enabling their ambitions in the region, protecting the Jewish occupiers; the elimination of Sunni influence in it [in Iraq]; the deterrence of the Sunna in the region generally; and the creation of a Shiite crescent, the idea and the execution of which they do not conceal. It has come about that Iraq, by virtue of its Islamic and Arab character, and by virtue of its geography, its history and its [natural-resource] wealth is something they wish to dissipate and plunder. Its official division has become a public [plan], and it can be expected to occur at any moment. [Already] the rafida have the south and the main provinces of the center; the Kurds have the north; the Sunnis have what remains in the center.

Here is an another excerpt:

[Sunnis should not stand idly by as their brother Sunnis are killed, tortured and displaced in Iraq, but should] expose the practices of the rafida at every level and every position of every pulpit and gathering and opportunity--more than that, you should call special meetings on this subject, and you should besiege those who toy with Iraq and its people informationally and legally, and you should arouse the concern of the Islamic population to do their duty with respect to them.

On the specific question of jihad:

[The statement says jihad is unquestionably one of the basic ideas in religion] and what has been taken by force can only be recovered by force, and praise God there are among the mujahideen of Iraq wonderful examples of sacrifice and effort in the path of God, who have terrified the enemy and cut down their strength, and we value them for that and may God be pleased with them. However, there have been recent and novel events in the field that have emerged from our struggle, and they [the novelties] are in need of a legal grounding that cannot be found out except by those [clerics] of the divine science, who are more knowledgable, and have longer experience, and have a more fundamental understanding of these novelties, and who understand the reality of the struggle between ourselves and our enemy. And therefore we implore all the mujahideen to put their hands in the hands of the clerics, and not undertake anything without them...

The enemy have the US and Iran and the finances of Iraq behind them, the statements says in another place, and we (Sunnis everywhere) must not let them down. The gist of the whole statement seems to be a call to consciousness-raising about the dangers and the need for action. "What has been taken by force can only be recovered by force," but the ultimate question of jihad or not should be left to local religious authorities. But the underlying threat of spontaneous popular action is there.

In any event (according to the above-linked Elaph account today) that is the way the Shiite leadership in Najaf read the statement. Acting collectively, they issued a statement accusing these 38 Saudi sheikhs of "legitimizing the taking of blood and property and money of the Shiites". And the Najaf statement called on the Saudi authorities to take a "resolute position against the statement."

Al-Quds al-Arabi points out that the 38 do not include the popular preachers that have regular programs on Saudi state TV. So this is not yet a national cause. On the other hand, it remains to be seen how the Saudi government reacts to the call to take a resolute stand against the 38.

While it is understandable if Arab media turn away from publishing a statement like that of the 38, you do have to wonder how much of what is going on in the region is getting through to the US "policy makers". The NYT this morning buries a reference to this deep inside a story about Washington diplomacy, something they really like to write about.

AP humour story falls flat

Condoleeza Rice met yesterday in Amman with the heads of the national intelligence agencies of four countries: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE. According to a variety of different accounts, an anonymous US source told reporters their main topic of discussion was--you guessed it--formation of a national unity government in Palestine! (I'm pretty sure I saw an AP story to that effect, but in any effect that is also the gist of the Azzaman version this morning). However, Al-Quds al-Arabi says "observers think this meeting was in preparation for an American escalation against the Iranian presence in Iraq".

Participants included the big names, Omar Suleiman for Egypt and Prince Bandar bin Sultan now head of national security for Saudi Arabia, which shows the importance attributed to whatever it was they were talking about.

The Al-Quds reporters leave it at that. They then note that the biggest Jordanian opposition party, the Islamic Action Front, welcomed Rice to Jordan with a statement accusing her of inciting breakup of the unity of the Palestinian people, and of working to sabotage the Mecca agreement, fairly straightforward points. It would be interesting to see if they are included in the AP version of this. The leader of the IAF warned the government against cooperating with Rice "in sowing the seeds of fitna in the region, and in blowing up the Mecca agreement", adding a warning against "yielding to this American and Zionist usurpation [of the Palestinian process]".

The IAF leader also said the Jordan government needs to reply to a tendentious story that appeared the day before in the Israeli paper Maarif, that talked about a Jordanian plan to sideline Hamas, by first having Abbas form a peace agreement of some kind without the participation of Hamas, then arrange for new elections where Fatah could run on the peace platform. The Maarif story added that King Abdullah of Jordan commited to getting the big Arab regimes (in particular the four mentioned above, which Maarif has taken to calling the "Arab quartet") to approve of this plan and also to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. The implication seems to be that Maarif described the Jordanian "initiative" as having been foiled by the Mecca agreement. In any event, the IAF leader said the Jordanian administration needs to reply to the story.

Found it! The AP story is available here.

Reflections: Part II

(2) The "end-run around the resistance"

Another writer who is part of the Iraqi Patriotic Alliance resistance milieu is Saad Daoud Qiryaqous, author of a recent series of essays called "Some things that need to be said: About the National Patriotic Islamic Front". One of his main points about the proposed Damascus conference was that the organizers, or some of them, appeared to be ready to open the process to anyone, even those who have been either completely aloof from the resistance, or in fact cooperators in the occupation scheme, in one way or another, at one stage or another of that scheme. Qiryaqous included in that not only people like Allawi and his cohorts who have been actively involved with the Americans in oppressing the Iraqi people, but also, more broadly, intellectuals who have had nothing to do with the resistance, but are attracted by the prospect of getting in on the action now that the Americans appear to be ready to talk. He mentions in particular a symposium that was held in Beirut in 2005, headed by one Hayr al-Din Hasib "along with his allies who are anxious to negotiate with those how are occupying [the country of] their people." In the fourth installment of his series of essays, posted today on the IPA website, Qiryaqous puts it this way:

Let's put aside the reasons that were cited by some of the members of the organizing committee for the conference...and focus our attention on the real motives, which presumably the engineers of the concept of this conference at various levels wouldn't admit to. There are two parties that are behind this idea. The first and most important party is the leadership of Syria and its institutions. And the secondary party is the group of Hayr al-Din Hasib and his allies, who are anxious to negotiate with the occupiers. In addition to these two parties [promoting the idea of the conference] there are others, who we don't know whether they were involved in the original planning, or whether they got involved later for reasons of their own.

With respect to the "secondary party", outsiders to the resistance attempting to get in on the action, Qiryaqous explains:

The secondary party, or those involved in planning the Damascus Conference as secondary players, are the group known by [the name of a 2005 conference known as] the Beirut Conference and [by a slogan developed at that 2005 conference, namely] "The Iraq Assembly for Liberation and Construction". The reason for their passion for holding this Damascus Conference is [that they see this as] further to their plan to form an "Iraqi Team" which they can present to the American administration as something usable by them to carry out a staged (in the theatrical sense) withdrawal complete with surface negotiations with forces alleged to represent the Iraqi resistance and guarantees of a withdrawal with minimal financial and political cost, without [America] giving up its political and petroleum-related advantages in Iraq and in the region.

These are "opportunists", Qiryaqous says, and he uses a recurring phrase thoughout his series of essays in describing their plans: "Doing an end-run around the resistance".

(3) Premature negotiation equals sellout

This is another theme that runs though the recent literature on the Damascus Conference. But since it is a fairly straightforward point, and covered in the summary here of an earlier op-ed by Awni Qalamji, so I'll just note that this is a warning that this group continues to emphasize.

Finally, a few cautionary points by way of forestalling misinterpretations:

(1) While people in this IPA milieu all share a common orientation (independence from foreign agendas; primacy of the resistance when it comes to negotiations; no premature negotiations), they aren't always in lock-step. For instance, while Qalamji denounces what he considers the joint attitude of Syria and Iran in promoting the Damascus Conference, Qiryaqous takes a more nuanced position and says while the motives for undertaking the Damascus Conference reflect aims that aren't necessarily those of the resistance itself, still the bringing together of the resistance groups and the idea of forming a "Political Office" for the resistance is a positive thing, and it is even possible that at the end of the day Syria will see the light and support the genuine resistance. Similarly Qiryaqous holds out the possibility of the "Beirut Group" purging itself of its most opportunistic members and joining in the common cause (provide they recognize that fundamentally it is the resistance that is the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people). And so on. The point being that while it is easy to seize on statements made in the course of polemical discussions (and sometimes too quickly summarize them) as indicators of irreconcilable differences, that isn't always the correct reading.

(2) Speaking of the line between reconciliable and irreconcilable differences, in the above outline of points, I have purposely left out the issue of the split in the Baath between the Izzat al-Douri loyalists and the Yunis al-Ahmed (Syria-friendly) wing which came to light right after the execution of Saddam last fall. Regular readers will recall that Qalamji and others attributed the split to a play by Syria for regional influence, particularly vis-a-vis the US, and this is probably one of the undercurrents in the above-mentioned theme of "independence from foreign agendas", although the recent literature doesn't have a lot to say specifically about the Ahmed/Douri split. Possibly because it is a sore point. No less a person than Muslim Scholars head Harith al-Dhari was recently reported to be trying to arrange a reconciliation. However, it is also worth noting that the correspondent for Conflicts Forum has reported on a recent meeting between a US congressional delegation and the Al-Ahmed faction of the Iraqi Baath (in early July in Amman), summarizing this way:

While the early July Amman meeting between the Americans and representatives of the al-Ahmad faction did not result in any formal understandings between the representatives of the two groups, the Iraqi European mediator told us that the al-Ahman representatives made their own point of view clearly understood: If the United States would act decisively to end Iranian influence in Iraq, the Baath resistance would end its attacks on U.S. forces in western Iraq. Moreover, future talks in Amman would be held on “an accelerated and more substantive basis” if the Americans would act quickly and in good faith to take on what the al-Ahmad faction identified as “Iranian militias tied to the Quds brigades that are present in some parts of Iraq.”

The relationship, if any, of this meeting to the Damascus Conference isn't clear, but it's probably safe to say this is an example of the kind of "dealing" that the IPA writers summarized above have been warning against.

(3) There's a lot that is unclear in all of this. What I've tried to do here is merely broach some of the major topics that are being discussed among resistance spokespeople as the American military crisis starts to generate new issues for the resistance, including both a heightened need for unity, and at the same time an undesirable influx of outside parties drawn to this issue like flies to honey.

Special thanks to reader/commenter Allison for help with this.

Understanding the resistance, Part II: The mixing of symbols

Information Clearing House published on Friday the English version of a lengthy interview with Abduljabbar al Kubaysi, dated July 10 2007 or just in the run-up to the ultimately aborted Damascus Conference. The following brief excerpts and comments are only meant to encourage people to read the whole thing. Kubaysi says the US is behind a lot of the killing of civilians, as part of their efforts to foster a sectarian-based civil war; that the initial US aim was to install by military power an easily-manipulable Shiite government, but that the unexpected growth of the resistance caused them to design the "political process" as a way of getting Sunni groups involved, so as to drain the pool in which the Sunni resistance was able to thrive; but now that the Sunnis have become completely disaffected with the government, that strategy too has ended in failure.

Regionally, he says the original American plan was to blame Syria for letting AlQaeda into Iraq, and use that as the pretext for toppling Assad and setting up a Muslim Brotherhood government in Damascus, which would fight in support of the Iraqi Sunnis, with Iran on the other side supporting the Shiites, hoping in this way to trigger a regional war that would last decades. But the Iraqi resistance prevented that by denying them the first step, namely initial control of Iraq.

Kubaysi also made remarks of another type. This is a man who grew up and flourished in the culture of left-nationalism, now having to deal with a rising generation to whom those ideas and ideologies are largely a thing of the past, who are motivated rather by Islam. When he was asked "...what is the relation of the resistance to the salafi and takfiiri groups," his reply included this:

Regarding alQaeda, in the first two years they were a very limited force....Later they steadily gained ground and they still keep growing. They have a lot of money but they do not spend it on luxury life but live very decent life on minimum needs dedicating everything to the struggle, which shows a very serious and attracting behavior. They spend the money on the struggle. Most of the youths join them not for the ideology but because they offer a place to resist.

So first of all he honors these people for their seriousness and dedication to the cause of resistance. This is worth noting because where others would challenge the "ideology", Kubaysi says the ideology is secondary if that, and the point is the dedication to the practical cause. He goes on:

They have a lot of resources and a steady supply also from outside while the other groups get nearly nothing from outside. Today maybe we can say that al Qaeda is the first organisation of the resistance. They go separately from the others but nevertheless in each city there is a kind of council to co-ordinate military action, to chalk out a plan of defence.

Islam is a weapon to make the people rise up. The Islamic history, the Islamic figures, the Islamic culture is used to push the people to fight because they consider Islam as their identity. National and religious symbols are being mixed. The Koran says that if Islamic land is attacked by foreigners, armed resistance is obligatory. This is until today out of question in the common sense. Jihad becomes a Muslim duty for the people being occupied by foreign invaders like fasting and praying.

So all the resistance groups whether Islamic or not use this spirit as a tool to mobilise and raise the people. Take for example the statements of the Baath party and of Izzat al Durri personally. Judging by his language you would believe him to be an extreme Islamist. But this does not mean that all of them are really Islamists.

The entire environment is Islamic. By Marxist or nationalist calls you will not attract young people. Where ever young people go you will find Islamic sentiment and spirit dominating. This indirectly favours al Qaeda. People who join them do not feel to do something not normal as the general conditions are Islamic. On the contrary they will believe to only act consistently.

If people in the American orbit read this at all, no doubt their readings of it will differ, but to me the first and most important point for any analysis of the resistance is that you cannot pidgeonhole people and groups as if you were Linnaeus studying his butterflies or what have you. "National and religious symbols are being mixed..." We can assume Kubaysi knows something about the mixing of symbols, because in earlier years he was involved in working together with anti-Saddam nationalist Baathists, Communists, Kurdish nationalists, unaffiliated people, and so on. People of many ideologies faced with a common crisis. While the wisdom of the anglosphere has been to play up and highlight each and every prospect for internal strife, sunni/shiite and islamist/nationalist in particular, there is also an underlying dynamic that goes in the opposite direction, and it is the ability to overcome ideological differences and work together in a common crisis. This was no doubt key to defeating the American scheme in its first stages, and this is an ability that will no doubt continue to baffle and defeat the aggressors for as long as they persist.

A couple of "moderate" writers in a time of crisis

For pan-Arab writers like Abdulbari Atwan of Al-Quds al-Arabi, there was never any doubt about the nature of Bush-administration policy in Iraq and the whole region. It is anti-Arab and anti-Muslim. But "moderate" Arab writers have traditionally kept open the defence of incompetence or other extenuating circumstances. For one moderate writer, it seems as if something in his way of thinking snapped as a result of the Saddam lynching. Here's Daoud Shiryan writing on the opinions page of the moderate newspaper Al-Hayat yesterday:

Today, after the boasts of Maliki about the execution of Saddam in this barbaric way, and the agreement of the American government to this hanging, in this grotesque way counter to all American and human values, we need to stop talking about the American policy mistakes in Iraq, because what they are doing in that country is in pursuance of an intentional and a filthy plan, [where] they dissolved the Iraqi army, and then it was up to us [Arabs] to find excuses for their policies, undertaken in deliberate ignorance of regional history and Iraqi social structure, and when they permitted the adoption of a constitution that ended the Arab nature of Iraq, we called that democracy, but then came the execution of Saddam, and [finally] it was made clear to us that Washington is acting according to a savagery that is unprecedented, and they are now supporting a gang of Shiites to take the place of the neo-cons in the project that they call the new Iraq...

In other words, says Shiryan, the days when you could argue that the Americans were making mistakes in the region are over. It is an ugly thing to have to admit, but they are clearly acting deliberately, and the days of excusing them for making "mistakes" are over.

Here's another "moderate" writer, the Egyptian Fahmy Howeydi, writing this time in Asharq al-Awsat. He criticizes the lack of meaningful action by moderate Islamic authorities to counter the sectarian violence in Iraq, referring to a statement last week by a group headed by the famous preacher Qaradawi, which called attention in a vague way to the need to do something. But Howeydi says if they aren't going to name names or assign responsibility or take specific actions, then this is an issue that should be taken up by broader regional or international groups like the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or the Arab League. That is his first point. His next points have to do with how Iraq got the way it is; and what needs to be done immediately.
First how the fitna originated. He says his personal orientation had always been that he was Muslim and any Muslim stood in the same relationship to him as any other, regardless of sect, but he continues:

This (non-sectarian) attitude of mine started to change gradually with the advent of sectarian activities in Iraq, and I cannot overlook the fact that the occupation planted the seeds of this fitna when it undertook the formation of the first interim governing council on a sectarian and racial basis, which had he effect of marginalizing Sunni Arabs, and also had the effect of stimulating an extravagant craving on the part of Shiite leaders for ever deeper and broader influence, and a striving for more control of land and wealth, and then they went a step further in proposing the idea of "federalism", which for them meant a 9-province district in the south, where most of the country's oil wealth is located. And in order to implement that, groups affiliated with the so-called death squads used threats to ensure the sectarian "purity" of the areas in question, using methods unprecedented in the history of Iraq, a country where clans and tribes and marraiges were always mixed Sunni and Shia...

In other words, the seeds of fitna were sown by the occupation, which assigned quotas in the initial governing council according to sect and race, and that was what started the process of sectarian competition for influence and power, and this mushroomed via policies like federalism (and de-Baathification, which he doesn't mention) with the result that we now have.

On the question of what needs to be done Howeidy says it appears the Mahdi Army already controls East Baghdad and is now attacking Sunnis in the western part of the city, and there are all the various rumors of their benefitting from American air cover, Iranian funding and arms, and so on. There hasn't been any condemnation of any of this by the Najaf Shiite authorities. And even more important, Iran should state clearly its position on "the current ethnic cleansing", for instance by setting up a commission of inquiry.

While Howeydi lays the blame for starting the cycle of sectarian violence clearly at the feet of the American occupation, he says the most urgent current need is for Iran (and the Shiite authorities in Iraq) to step in and clarify what their position is. Howeydi differentiates between what was first in the causal chain of events, and what is first in terms of immediate requirements for action.

Al-Hayat: Non-Qaeda resistance groups talking to the government about tactical cooperation around Baghdad

Al-Hayat says there have developments in the relationship between the Maliki administration on the one side and armed groups and/or ex-Baathists on the other.

I.

First, the paper says "talks are ongoing between the government and seven armed-group factions that are active in the governates around Baghdad (including Anbar, Salahuddin and Diyala), following an announcement by these groups that they oppose the 'Islamic State' which AlQaeda is promoting," attributing this to sources both in the government and "close to the armed groups".

The journalist quotes an Iraqi army officer, Riyadh al-Shamari who said representatives of "seven well-known factions" were in Baghdad last week for talks with the government "that centered on cooperation in fighting AlQaeda in the outskirts of Baghdad." And the journalist explains that the government thinks the outskirts of Baghdad is currently the originating source of all terrorist activity. The same army officer said these groups have had some success in limiting the activities of Al-Qaeda in areas including Abu Ghraib and Falluja, and he said this has been an important support for the Baghdad security plan that Maliki has been carrying out for the last month.

The sources said the recent Baghdad discussions "went beyond the differences" that separate the armed groups from the government, which (differences) include the question of revising Sunni representation in the government. In other words, according to this account, they focused on a common interest in fighting AlQaeda in the area around Baghdad, leaving the political discussions for another day.

In the same vein, the writer quotes a government official in Salahuddin who said the Islamic Army in Iraq opposes the Islamic State of Iraq, and is supported in this by local tribes that have refused to pledge allegeance to AlQaeda, and they have faced AlQaeda in Tikrit and in Samarra and Al-Dawra, and in other areas adjacent to Diyala governate. And this Salahuddin official said the local government is trying to act as an intermediary in arranging for an agreement between the [Islamic] Army and the government.

By way of background, the writer reminds readers of a recent announcement of an attempt to form an alliance of non-Qaeda armed groups, including Islamic Army, Brigades of the 1920 Revolution, Army of the Rashidin and others, to offset the "Mujahidin Shura Concil" which they say is controlled by AlQaeda, itself recently morphed into the "Islamic State of Iraq". The writer describes the non-Qaeda alliance as an "attempt to redraw the map of the resistance."

So the gist of this part of the report is the reported polarization of the armed resistance into a Qaeda-affiliated part and a non-Qaeda-affiliated one, with the latter now (according to this report) actually talking to the government about tactical cooperation in fighting the Qaeda groups in the area around Baghdad.


II.

This same Al-Hayat piece also takes up the question of Syria and the Baathists. Here the writer sources the story with a little less assurance, writing only that "some reports indicate" that Syria has been sponsoring Iraqi negotiations with Baathist leaders, including Mohamed Yunis al-Ahmad, and other Baath leaders from the Saddam era. (This is the group that the Saddam loyalists led by Izzat al-Douri consider traitors). Ssomeone in the Yunis camp said they have succeeded in winning over some from the Douri camp, but he says this is in exchange for action of the full list of Sunni demands including "re-drawing the political map", constitution-reform, de-Debaathification, and so on, and including "finding a suitable formula for requiring the foreign forces to leave Iraq..." so there seems to be some wishful thinking involved, at least in this part of the report.

"Mahdism" and the Sadrist resistance (with an update in real time)

The Sadrist site alamara.net has this at the top of its main page this morning (Friday May 16). (The dots are what I left out being not sure of the meaning). It is a prayer, not attributed to anyone, and headed: "The resistance remains our strength, and our aim is the liberation of Iraq."

Know, our protector and the lord of time, that we have progressed with your aid in the preparation of your state, the state of right, which will fill the earth with justice and with equity...even as we have filled the hearts of the ...occupier with fear and dread.

And know, our Sayyid Moqtada al-Sadr, that we will not yield to anyone but you, nor will we go forward except with you--no matter how the agents and infiltrators lure the people from you, and no matter how they try to kill us and to expose our corpses. They kill only the body, whose destiny is dust, but not our spirit or our mind, and not the sadriin within us, and we say to them... your group is nothing but numbers, and your days are fated...God will not suppress our inspiration or erase our memory.

The mention of exposure of corpses refers back to a report a few days ago of Iraqi government forces driving around Sadr City with bodies to intimidate the people. And obviously the whole prayer is on the occasion of the cease-fire, if that is what it is.

More particularly, in addition to the points about loyalty and religion, there is that striking reference to what sounds like a "millenarian" belief in a new world of justice on earth, that is in preparation. As it happens, Reidar Visser has just published a study talking about some of the constituent elements in the Sadrist tradition, among them: Social conservatism; Iraqi nationalism, which is very pronounced among the Sadrists compared to, for example, the Dawa and SupremeCouncil trends; a tendency in some groups to question the authority of the established authorities, in favor of direct inspiration; and finally, "Mahdism" or the theme of emergence of the hidden Mahdi and the establishment of a state of universal justice.

Visser explains that the Mahdist theme isn't in and of itself special to the Sadrists, but has been integral to Shiism over the centuries. But what is particularly worth noting about post-2003 Iraq is the repeated emergence of forms of "pure" Mahdism, with groups like the "Army of Heaven", the followers of Ahmed al Yamani, and others. What makes them distinctive and radical is (1) the intensity of their belief in a near-term emergence of the Mahdi, and (2) their unequivocal rejection of the Najaf authorities, in favor of the inspiration and relevation given to those who understand what is about to happen.

Moqtada al-Sadr, Visser says, has made frequent references to "establishment of the Mahdist state", but he notes:

It needs to be appreciated that such evocation of the Mahdi's appearance is a perfectly integral aspect of traditional Shiism and not something which in itself can justify the label of unorthodoxy. While some of the rhetoric of the Sadrists may perhaps prompt suspicions of mysticism, Sadrist policies are often down-to-earth to the point where those looking for the exotic may end up feeling disappointed. One Sadrist manifesto, for example, begins with a dramatic assertion that it is the ambition of the Sadrists to pave the way for the "government of total justice [i.e., the state of the Mahdi, Visser's brackets] but then goes on to enumerate a plan of action featuring comparatively mundane items, including "the fair distribution of natural resources such as oil among the Iraqis, without regard to religion, sect, or ethnicity."

But Visser adds that Sadr and the Sadrist trend, for all their continued respect for the structure of authority in Najaf and their specific Iraqi nationalism, still belong at one end of the same spectrum or broad family, to which the "pure Mahdists" also belong at the other end. And his point is that this possibility or risk of a turn to radical Mahdism, along with radical separatist thinking, that emerges from time to time in the South, should be borne in mind by the people who concoct policy for the Americans and the British, because a frontal assault on Sadr and the Sadrists could push the movement or at least important parts of it in the radical direction (both in terms of separatism and in terms of Mahdism).

(From a policy perspective, it is the same point that is made time and again with respect to Sunni groups, in the sense that rejection of the accommodating trends in the MB and elsewhere serves to help the takfiiri types in their recruiting. And this kind of policy-recommendation always arouses in me the same nagging feeling: Surely along with the mind-set of the various Islamic groups, something else even more important needs to be studied: namely the mind-set of the Western policy-elite itself, which persists in these destructive and counter-productive policies of negotiation-by-violence, even when the effects of it are made clear to them).

But my point here is a completely different point. It is that for Sadr and the Sadrists, the fight against the occupation is seen through the lens of "Mahdism" in the sense that their whole training and tradition is steeped in the expectation of a strong kind of historical change, meaning, for instance, that relations--for instance between the Mahdi Army and the Iraqi forces--will not always be as they seem to be now, namely in this case in a relationship of enmity. And the "preparing of the way" for the new world includes points as "mundane" as learning how to fight the enemy without at the same time fighting other Iraqis. This isn't the "pure Mahdism" of the crazies like Ahmed al Yamani and the others. But at the same time, it does represent for the Sadrists a guiding principle that is an inner strength, or perhaps an inner weakness depending on your point of view, but that in any event is a feature of their behavior it might be worth keeping in mind when trying to understand their behavior.

___________________

UPDATE: As of the end of the day Friday, the first news item under the above-quoted invocation went like this:

[Sadr office spokesperson Salah al-Obeidi] said a delegation including five leaders of the Sadrist trend arrived in Sadr City on Friday, bearing with them with instructions from the leader Sayyed Moqtada al-Sadr to continue implementation of the agreement that has been signed with the United Iraqi Alliance. Obeidi told AFP there is what he called good cooperation between the [UIA] and the Sadrist trend, and he said there is hope for a withdrawal of the American forces from Sadr City at the earliest possible time.

For his part, Sheikh Muhamad al-Musawi, who heads the delegation, in the Friday sermon today, urged the people of Sadr City to respect the agreement and to cease firing. He added in explanations to AFP that the advise of Moqtada al-Sadr is for avoiding the shedding of blood, and [the text said] "that he does not wish for any Iraqi to kill his brother Iraqi."

Musawi said the leader Sayyed Moqtada al-Sadr informed them that if a person wishes to become a martyr, it is incumbent on him to fight the American forces; and that "the Sadrist trend loves peace, and extends its hand to the Iraqi security forces", in his words.

Saudi writer: Will Bush know enough to look for a negotiated solution, or will he just carry on trying to inflame the Arab regimes against Iran ?

Bilal al-Hassan is writes a regular political column for Asharq al-Awsat. (He happens to be Palestinian, apparently the younger brother of one of the longest-serving "historical Fatah" figures and former Arafat associates Hani al-Hassan). His column today (Sunday December 3) on Iraq and the Bush administration is notable for a number of reasons. Here is a summary of his argument:

While the Bush administration seems to be rejecting the idea of talks with Syria and Iran, this would be a mistake, because these are two countries through which fighters and weapons transit to Iraq, and serious discussions with them could result in putting a stop to that, thus contributing greatly to Iraqi internal stability. Moreover, there are indications that both Syria and Iran are being amenable. For instance, Syria refused the invitation to participate in a three-way summit in Tehran, out of deference to the Arab position; and Iran, for its part, has said there is an important role in the Iraq-pacification process for both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Bush administration, al-Hassan says, should pay careful heed to these signs.

More important is the question of defining what the Iraqi problem is, and here al-Hassan cites statements by Maliki, (parliament president) Mashhadani, and Talabani, all indicating that the problem, far from being exclusively a security problem, is first and foremost a political problem, and the security problems derive from that.

Al-Hassan says a number of conclusions and requirements for action derive from that: (1) There has to be a real American troop-withdrawal, according to a well-defined and thought-out schedule. (2) The Iraqi constitution, whose outlines were first drawn up under the Bremer regime, fosters sectarianism and militates against a sense of national identity (apparently referring to the party-list proportional representation voting system), and this needs to be changed. (3) The concept of federal regions is also a problem. (He adds here in the regional context, partition is something that "is rejected by the Arabs and by the Turks, but it is sufficiently clear that it is not rejected by Iran"). Here too the solution is a new constitution, that would better found the notion of national identity.

Putting this another way, al-Hassan says the answer to Iraq's problems doesn't lie in the direction of the recent "Mecca document", which was a call to end sectarian violence in and of itself; nor in the direction of a Kosovo-style international conference of the type suggested by Kofi Annan, rather it requires a new Iraqi constitution. (Here al-Hassan refers to work already being done by something called the Institute for Studies in Arab Unity in Beirut, and he mentions its leader, one Khayr al-Din Hasib).

Finally, al-Hassan says it is worth studying the differences in approach between the Iranian concept and the Saudi concepts of how to proceed. Based on newspaper reports, he said, the Iranian idea is first to insist on American withdrawal based on a fixed timetable. Secondly (and al-Hassan says he sees a contradiction here), the Iranian plan is for formation of a central government, but also for formation of "Iraqi federalism based on the existing central government". The third Iranian point (according to al-Hassan) is a "rejection of going back to traditional politics in the region, at the expense of the existing system, [in other words rejection of] a return to the exclusion of the Shiite majority from power, which would only increase the chances of separation [of Iraq into three parts]".

Al-Hassan summarizes his criticism of the Iranian approach as follows: It would do away with the American occupation, but it would retain all of the internal fragmentation that went with it. So this should be a point of discussion with the Iranians.

The Saudi approach, he says, was laid down in a cabinet decision of November 27 (the first Saudi cabinet meeting following the famous Cheney visit), and it includes the following main points: (1) Emphasis on regional and historical "balance", which means treating the question of Shiite Sunni balance on a regional basis, and not just on an Iraqi basis; and (2) finding ways to convert the American "occupation" to UN "supervision", for which the Security Council would have to take the initiative.

Al-Hassan says on the face of it this is the Iranians siding with the Shiites and Saudi siding with the Sunni, but he says there is a way of mediating that: Via his idea of a new constitution that would foster national identity at the expense of sectarian identity.

The question, al-Hassan says, is Bush. Will he rest content with just having meetings, or will he have the capacity to grasp the political problem in its entirely, a political problem, he adds, which is of his own creation and that of his military leaders. Will he look for solutions, or will he satisfy himself with continuing his inflammatory remarks against Iran, and his attempt to marshall the Arab regimes against that country? Will he keep up with his slogans about not leaving until the task is done, or will he remember that it is permitted for him to act as the leader of a country, and not just as the leader of a military organization?

Baath resistance views for the post-Saddam period: A more global, AlQaeda-like world-view

Al-Quds al-Arabi publishes the full text of the Baath party statement on the sentencing of Saddam Hussein, and there are a couple of important points about resistance strategy, in addition to the two points highlighted by Al-Hayat and summarized in the prior post.

The statement is divided into seven background points, then another series of points relating to plans for action. The claim that Saddam refused to bargain with the occupation is point number 5 of the first list. It is followed by a point emphasizing the relationship of the judgment against Saddam (Nov 5) to the US congressional elections (Nov 7). Then in the seventh and final background point, the statement outlines the Baath party view that what the US is aiming for in Iraq is not necessarily partition, but first and foremost a weak Iraq, without a strong enough central government to be able to resist caving in to US and other foreign pressure.

The argument goes like this: The Americans condemned Saddam to death just before their occupation project fails completely, because they know that with Saddam at the head of the government, restoration of security, stability and services would be a matter of hours, not of years. And one result of that would be that Iraq would again have a voice in the affairs of the region, stronger in fact that before. And for that reason the Americans are against a rapid restoration of stability, favoring rather the creation of "an Iraq free but weak, susceptible to external pressure and to the dictation of conditions, incapable of responding or warding off the return of American colonialism via the window of governmental weakness, after having been expelled by the door of armed resistance. The American plan now, having become convinced that the coming freedom is a certainty (meaning: US forces will be expelled by force), is to agree to the establishment of a national government, but a weak one, and one lacking the polarizing element necessary to unify attitudes, and take the required bold and historic decisions necessitated by the absense of Saddam..."

In other words, the US on the verge of being expelled will be too weak to partition the country, so the next best thing will be make sure that the government is a weak one. (As an assessment of American strategy, this is worth noting quite apart from question whether the net effect of executing Saddam would actually be to make an eventual government stronger or weaker).

In the second series of points, relating to future actions, there is an interesting combination of traditional nationalist positions with a more global view. For instance, point number two of the second list is a call for "complete and unconditional withdrawal" of the US troops. But then point number three warns that if Saddam is executed, the hardliners will have the upper hand in the councils of the resistance, and that means switching to a strategy of attrition against US and actually barring the troops from leaving. Here the focus shifts from merely freeing Iraq, to bringing down the American empire by bleeding them in Iraq. This is a view much closer to the global near-enemy/far-enemy long-term analysis of AlQaeda than to traditional national resistance.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Iraqi Baath party is reaching out to the Baath and other parties and intellectuals in the region. This isn't just the problem of one party or one country, the statement says: "Rather, before all of that, it is a question of the fate of the ummah faced with annihilation and change in its national identity. Because on the day when Iraq is destroyed amid the silence or the collusion of intellectuals and national parties, the next day they will see that it is their turn..."